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In September 1905, Frederick W.G. Haultain, Premier of the North-West 
Territories, was not asked to form the first government of either Saskatchewan or 
Alberta.  Many considered his treatment scandalous, especially since Haultain had 
distinguished himself during the Territorial period.  As the Territorial government’s first 
leader, Haultain worked tirelessly to provide the region with the services the residences 
of the other provinces took for granted. Despite these achievements, Haultain was not a 
good strategic thinker.  After 1905, Haultain formed the Provincial Rights Party and 
served as the first leader of the opposition in Saskatchewan.  Haultain retired from 
politics in 1912 after failing to secure a majority in three successive elections.  
Haultain’s reputation as an elder statesman developed after his death in 1941. 
Many scholars have blamed Liberal politicians for Haultain’s marginalization.  
In reality, by 1905 Haultain had undermined his own base of support by making poor 
political choices that alienated his supporters.  In seeking provincehood for the North-
West Territories, Haultain unwisely alienated his Cabinet colleagues whose support was 
essential to maintaining the Assembly’s confidence in the government.  He also failed to 
build the Provincial Rights Party into a serious alternative to the Liberals because he 
lacked some important political skills.  Haultain failed to enlist any talented individuals 
to serve along side him in the Assembly.  Most importantly, Haultain failed to realize 
that it was practically impossible to form a government without the support of rural 
Saskatchewan, and took many positions that alienated farmers.  His failure to support 
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Frederick William Gordon Haultain has been largely forgotten.  Given the 
important role Haultain played in shaping the institutions of government in 
Saskatchewan and Alberta, many have found this difficult to explain.  Haultain entered 
Territorial politics shortly after moving to Fort Macleod in 1884 to start a legal practice.  
He was elected to the Territorial Council in 1888 and quickly rose to prominence.  He 
was chairman of the Advisory Council (1888-1896), Premier and Attorney-General of 
the North-West Territories (1897-1905), Leader of the Opposition in the Legislative 
Assembly of Saskatchewan (1905-1912) and Chief Justice of Saskatchewan (1917-
1938).  During the 1890s, Haultain led the faction in the Assembly that petitioned the 
lieutenant-governors and Parliament for responsible government for the North-West 
Territories.  In doing this, Haultain established a non-partisan tradition that a multitude 
of twentieth century third parties built on, some with great success.  Haultain was 
appointed premier when the North-West Territories achieved responsible government in 
1897, serving until 1905.  He used his position to secure provicehood for Alberta and 
Saskatchewan.  Yet, few actually remember the man and fewer still can point to a 
legacy.  Is this an appropriate fate for the North-West Territories’ first and only premier? 
1 
 Frederick W.G. Haultain was born in the English borough of Woolwich on 25 
November 1857.  His father, Frederick W. Haultain, was a career officer in the Imperial 
Army, retiring as a lieutenant colonel in 1860.  Many of Lieutenant Colonel Haultain’s 
early postings were in British North America.  Fascinated with the young country, upon 
his discharge Colonel Haultain settled in Peterborough, Upper Canada.  Colonel 
Haultain’s imperialism and his belief that politics was a noble profession explain his 
involvement in the Conservative Party.  In 1861, he was elected to the Legislature of the 
Province of Canada as a supporter of Prime Minister John A. Macdonald and, in time, 
Macdonald’s plan to confederate the British North American provinces.  It was in 
Canada under this new constitution—the British North America Act, 1867—that the 
young Frederick W.G. Haultain came of age. 
The family moved to Montreal in the late 1860s.  Colonel Haultain had accepted 
the position of secretary to the French Canadian Missionary Society of the Presbyterian 
Church.  There, young Frederick finished his secondary schooling.  The family returned 
to Peterborough when Colonel Haultain was appointed the Land Recorder of the county. 
Young Frederick briefly considered a military career, accepting a commission with the 
57th Rifles Regiment.  In the autumn of 1876 Haultain enrolled in the University of 
Toronto and convocated with a first class degree in classics in 1879.  Deciding to pursue 
a legal career, he articled with Bethune, Moss, and Falconbridge.  He was called to the 
Law Society of Upper Canada in 1882.1  The young lawyer began practicing in 
Kingston.  Around this time, younger brother Wilmot was homesteading in Manitoba.  
He wrote Frederick extolling the virtues of the West: he claimed that the limitless 
                                                 
1 Fort Macleod Museum and Archives, Haultain fonds, certificate of admission to the 
Law Society of Upper Canada. 
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 potential of western Canada held much opportunity for an ambitious solicitor.  The 
sudden death of Fredrick’s father seems to have spurred the decision to move west.  He 
wrote Charles McCaul, a University classmate who was practicing law in Fort Macleod, 
asking about the opportunities for a young solicitor in the North-West Territories.  
McCaul’s reply was succinct; they could discuss that when Haultain arrived.2
Haultain arrived in Fort Macleod in September, 1884.  He was only the second 
barrister and solicitor in the area so he quickly prospered; the presence of a second 
barrister meant that the circuit court could now include a session in Fort Macleod.  
Haultain’s university degree, legal training, and family background established him 
automatically as a member of the elite.3  He was easygoing, friendly and a skilled orator 
which made him an ideal candidate for office.  When Viscount Boyle resigned as 
Macleod’s representative in the Council of the North-West Territories, Haultain was 
willingly drafted to run.  He won in a close election against C.F.P. Conybeare, taking his 
seat in 1887.4  Over the next fifteen years, only once would he not win his seat by 
acclamation. 
The North-West Territories was granted representative government in 1888 and a 
Legislative Assembly replaced the Legislative Council.  Haultain quickly became the 
leading member of the Assembly, a fact that did not escape the lieutenant-governor’s 
notice.  The 1887 amendment to The North-West Territories Act included provision for a 
four-member Advisory Council appointed from the members of the Legislative 
                                                 
2 Grant MacEwan, Frederick Haultain, Frontier Statesman of the Canadian Northwest 
(Saskatoon: Western Producer Prairie Books, 1985), 14-15. 
3 Glenbow Archives, Sir Frederick W.G. Haultain Fonds, Haultain to ‘Mother’, 8 June 
1885, Box 1, File 1. 
4 Saskatchewan Archives Board, “Saskatchewan Executive and Legislative Directory,” 
December 2002, Sec 1, 25. 
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 Assembly.  The Council was to advise the lieutenant-governor in allocating the funds 
raised by the Assembly.  Haultain was a natural choice to chair the committee.  His 
education and legal training made him the ideal Crown servant; his popularity ensured 
he would have the Assembly’s support.  There were no political parties during the 
Territorial period; with a powerless Assembly, they would have been redundant.  
Haultain used his position as chairman of the Advisory Council to slowly build support 
in the Assembly. 
As chair of the Advisory Committee, Haultain was not an impartial civil servant.  
Due to his legal expertise, his knowledge of public policy, and his popularity, the 
lieutenant-governor often deferred to Haultain's judgement on political matters.  The 
North-West Territories Act limited the Advisory Council’s jurisdiction to appropriating 
funds raised by the Legislature, leaving the federal grant in the hands of the lieutenant-
governor.  However, by 1888 the Assembly was appropriating the entire budget.5  In 
leading the Assembly, Haultain slowly became the de facto head of the government of 
the North-West Territories. 
Each lieutenant-governor came to depend on Haultain’s advice in selecting the 
other committee members, and Haultain’s advice was given with an eye towards 
building support for his administration.  These committee members therefore owed 
Haultain their loyalty.  By 1897, Haultain had created and groomed a base of support for 
his leadership within the Assembly.  He was creating a political party in all but name.  It 
was a ‘court party’, an association of Members of the Legislative Assembly united 
                                                 
5 Lewis Herbert Thomas, The Struggle for Responsible Government in the North-West 
Territories, 1870-97, 2nd ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1978), 163-166. 
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 behind the lieutenant-governor and his Advisory Council.6  In leading the Assembly, 
Haultain exercised real power—power Haultain used to lobby the federal government to 
grant the North-West Territories true responsible government.  When responsible 
government was formally established in 1897, Haultain was the natural choice for the 
premiership.  He was the only person capable of commanding the support of a majority 
in the Assembly.  This was in large part due to the absence of political parties in the 
Assembly. 
By 1903, the Legislative Assembly of the North-West Territories had all the 
important powers of a provincial legislature, save one.  The Assembly did not control 
Crown land; the Department of the Interior did, and the lucrative revenue that came from 
its management was deposited in the federal treasury.  Prior to the introduction of 
provincial income tax in the twentieth century, income generated by Crown land formed 
the bulk of provincial revenue.  Parliament’s yearly grant-in-aid—designed to 
compensate for this lack of revenue—was not growing as quickly as expenditures.  A 
growing number of homesteaders expected Haultain’s government to provide an array of 
services such as roads and schools—services which the Assembly was finding it 
increasingly difficult to fund.  With Parliament's repeated failure to address the situation 
directly, many assemblymen, including Haultain, slowly concluded that the only 
solution was provincial autonomy. 
The unity of Haultain’s supporters began to fray when he began seeking 
provincial autonomy.  Despite Haultain’s protestations to the contrary, there was little 
                                                 
6 Stanley Gordon refers this to Haultain’s use of patronage to build support among non-
partisan assemblymen as a “Quasi-party system.”  See “F.W.G. Haultain, Territorial 
Politics and the Quasi-Party System,” Prairie Forum, 6, No. 1 (1981), 4-5. 
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 consensus as to what the autonomy settlement should contain.  While westerners saw the 
Territorial system of government as a transitional phase, many felt that the north-west 
should be divided into multiple provinces.  Many also were willing to accept a grant-in-
aid in lieu of control over Crown land.  Many of his supporters abandoned Haultain 
when it became clear that he was not willing to negotiate with Prime Minister Sir 
Wilfrid Laurier.  When he broke with his non-partisan stance by campaigning for Robert 
Borden in the 1904 federal election, Haultain alienated most of his supporters.  This 
fractured the government, causing most Liberals to abandon him. 
In forming the two original provincial administrations in 1905, Prime Minister 
Laurier refused to consider Haultain for the premiership of either province.  Laurier 
privately admitted that had autonomy been granted in 1903, it would have been difficult 
to deny Haultain a premiership because of the high esteem in which he was held.  But by 
1905, Laurier had found Haultain difficult to negotiate with because he was unwilling 
compromise on his position.  Haultain even declared that he would have the autonomy 
acts tested before the courts if Laurier brought them into force.  This infuriated the 
Prime Minister.  Haultain had already alienated the Territorial Liberals and their leader 
George H.V. Bulyea by refusing a federal grant-in-aid and accepting the Honorary 
Presidency of the Territorial Conservative Association.  When Bulyea withdrew his 
support, it became possible for Laurier to brush the Territorial Premier aside and call on 
Walter Scott to form the first government of Saskatchewan.  This was possible because 
Haultain had alienated too many territorial Liberals without building a corresponding 
Conservative base. 
 6
 Haultain continued on after 1905 in the Legislative Assembly of Saskatchewan, 
forming the first protest party in Canadian history.  The extent to which it was a true 
protest party is debatable because it was closely aligned with and would ultimately be 
absorbed into the Conservative Party.  The Provincial Rights Party was nevertheless an 
attempt to continue the “non-partisan” political tradition that Haultain had established 
during the 1890s.  It failed because Haultain was unable to take advantage of the Liberal 
government’s weaknesses.  Haultain retired from politics in 1912 and was appointed to 
the bench, eventually becoming Chief Justice of Saskatchewan.  It was after his 
retirement and death in 1942 that Haultain gained a reputation as the elder statesman of 
the west. 
Grant MacEwan, Haultain’s only biographer, believed that Haultain’s 
disappearance from public memory was a disgrace.7  MacEwan wrote Frederick 
Haultain, Frontier Statesman of the Canadian Northwest largely with the intent of 
resurrecting Haultain's memory by celebrating his political achievements.8  Frontier 
Statesman is celebratory and largely uncritical of its subject, as was most of MacEwan’s 
work.  Still, the book was a bestseller and MacEwan’s lively work remains the standard 
account of Haultain’s life and career. 
MacEwan paints Haultain as the creator of western Canada’s political 
institutions.  In MacEwan’s version, Haultain takes the flawed Legislative Assembly 
created by Parliament and provides western Canada with the best government he can.  
                                                 
7 Trained as an agronomist, MacEwan worked as an academic, politician and journalist.  
He also wrote books and articles on the history of the Canadian West.  His works on 
western Canadian history were usually bestsellers. 
8 Grant MacEwan, Frederick Haultain, Frontier Statesman of the Canadian Northwest 
(Saskatoon: Western Producer Prairie Books, 1985). 
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 As the limits of the Territorial constitution become obvious, Haultain successfully 
lobbied Parliament to expand the jurisdiction of the Legislative Assembly.  This struggle 
culminated in 1897 when the North-West Territories was granted responsible 
government.  This was a significant achievement and likely the pinnacle of Haultain’s 
career, but MacEwan is completely oblivious to Haultain’s failings.  He does not 
comment on Haultain’s failure to organise a functional political party after 1905.  To 
MacEwan, Haultain failed to obtain a premiership because of Laurier’s interference and 
not because of any personal failing on Haultain’s part. 
C. Cecil Lingard and Lewis Herbert Thomas on the other hand, examine the 
evolution of the territorial system of government in Canada.9  Each author places 
Haultain firmly within an analysis of the Territorial system of government.  There is a 
limited amount of attention paid to the collapse of the non-partisan government; neither 
addresses Haultain’s post-1905 career.  Still, while neither book focuses specifically on 
Haultain, it is clear that he played a crucial role in the obtainment of responsible 
government and autonomy. 
Lingard’s Territorial Government in Canada is an analysis of the evolving 
system of governing the North-West Territories.  It focuses on the attempts of the 
Territorial government to obtain provincial autonomy for the North-West.  Premier 
Haultain played a crucial role, but he was by no means central.  Territorial Government 
has been the defining work exploring the constitutional evolution of the North-West 
Territories.  Haultain’s policies were the result of the inability of Ottawa to come up 
                                                 
9 C. Cecil Lingard, Territorial Government in Canada: The Autonomy Question in the 
old North-West Territories (Toronto: The University of Toronto Press, 1946); Lewis 
Herbert Thomas, The Struggle for Responsible Government in the North-West 
Territories, 1870-97 2nd ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1978) 
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 with a permanent solution to finance the regional government.  With the responsibilities 
of a province and the taxing powers of a municipal council, the Territorial government 
was going broke.10  Haultain became the leader of the autonomy movement when it 
became clear Ottawa was not willing to address the looming fiscal crisis.  Provincial 
jurisdiction over Crown land would solve the North-West’s problems. 
In The Struggle for Responsible Government in the North-West Territories 1870-
97, Lewis Herbert Thomas examines the evolution of local government in the North-
West from the transfer of Rupert’s Land and the North-West Territories to Canada to the 
acceptance of responsible government in 1897.  Thomas believes that the most important 
event in the West’s constitutional evolution was the establishment of responsible 
government within the Whig interpretation of British constitutionalism.  The “struggle” 
for responsible government is the region’s attempt to assert the political rights inherent 
in British citizenship.  Again, while Haultain plays a central role, it is by no means 
pivotal. 
Haultain’s present reputation is rooted in his “fight” with Ottawa to preserve the 
“rights” of the West.  Grant MacEwan originally resurrected Haultain from an ignoble 
anonymity but his book was a non-critical celebration of this struggle.  At one point, he 
even goes so far as to argue that had Haultain become premier in 1905 he would have 
been one of the western politicians invited to join the Union government in 1917 and 
this would have made him Borden’s natural successor as prime minister.11
                                                 
10 Haultain himself originally argued against provincehood; since the problem was a 
matter of finance it could be solved simply by the federal parliament amending the 
North-West Territories Act to give the Legislative Assembly of the North-West 
Territories the powers of the provincial legislature. 
11 MacEwan, Frederick Haultain, 5. 
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 Haultain, however, was not a political genius.  He was outmanoeuvred easily, not 
because of Liberal scheming, but because of his poor political skills.  He made several 
mistakes in 1904 that destroyed his coalition.  Had autonomy not been just over the 
horizon, his government would have likely fallen.  Haultain attempted to continue in the 
non-partisan tradition after 1905 by forming the supposedly non-partisan Provincial 
Rights Party.  While he continued in politics as Leader of the Opposition in the 
Legislative Assembly of Saskatchewan, he failed to make any inroads against the Scott 
government.  Haultain wanted to discuss terms of autonomy when the rest of the 
province focused on developing the provincial economy.  Haultain ultimately failed to 
regain the premiership because of his poor political choices. 
Unfortunately, no significant collection of Haultain papers exists.  This may 
explain in part why there is such a limited amount of scholarly analysis of Haultain or 
the Provincial Rights Party.   Fortunately, as is the case with most public figures, there is 
no shortage of third party commentary on Haultain’s public actions.  Many of Haultain’s 
contemporaries discuss him in their personal papers and the news media reported his 
public acts in detail.  Haultain was a talented debater and parliamentarian, so the 
‘Newspaper Hansard’ is therefore a particularly useful to any scholar of Haultain or the 
government of the period.12  Haultain could usually be counted upon to describe in detail 
his reasons for his actions.  These sources compensate for the lack of Haultain’s private 
papers.   
                                                 
12 While no official transcript of debates of the Territorial or Provincial Assembly prior 
to the 1940s, most newspapers published verbatim transcripts of the pervious day’s 
debates.  Successive clerks of the Legislative Assembly of the North-West Territories 
and the Saskatchewan collected most of these articles, organizing them chronologically 
in scrapbooks.  The “Newspaper Hansard” is now in the care of Saskatchewan Archives 
Board.   
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 A chronological narrative of Haultain’s public actions between 1903 and his 
retirement in 1912 can be constructed from these sources.  This places Haultain’s actions 
in context and allows the reasoning for them to be analyzed.  What Haultain did, or 
failed to do, during this period shed light on the collapse of the non-partisan movement, 
the details of timing of the autonomy settlement, and Saskatchewan’s failure to develop 
an opposition party capable of challenging Liberal hegemony until the 1930s.  Scholars 
have analyzed these events for generations without attempting to explore Haultain’s 
role.   
A proper and full assessment of the politics of the west during first decade of the 
twentieth century cannot exist in the absence of a discussion of Haultain’s contribution.  
It is often forgotten that constitutions are as much, if not more, a product of political 
circumstance as philosophical musing about the ideal function of government.  During 
the first decade of the twentieth century, the kernel of the provincial constitution was 












Towards Provincial Autonomy, 1902-1904 
 
At the beginning of the twentieth century, Premier Frederick W.G. Haultain was 
the dominant political figure in the North-West Territories.  Haultain was at the pinnacle 
of his career.  The premier was widely credited with bringing responsible government to 
the North-West Territories in 1897.  The government’s supporters held an overwhelming 
majority in the Legislative Assembly and Liberal MPs spoke favourably of Haultain, 
echoing many of his arguments in the House of Commons.  Still, a crisis was brewing—
a crisis Haultain was cognizant of, but powerless to resolve.  Faced with the twin 
problems of the government’s spiralling expenses and the Assembly’s powerlessness to 
raise additional revenue, the Premier shocked his supporters when he tried to force 
Prime Minister Sir Wilfrid Laurier to resolve this.  Haultain argued that the entire North-
West Territories should become a single province under terms similar to Canada’s 
original four provinces.  His single-minded pursuit of this policy alienated most of his 
supporters and this undermined his authority. 
At the turn of the twentieth century, the North-West Territories was broke.  The 
population had more than doubled during the 1890s, going from 67,000 people in 1891 
12 
 to 159,000 in 1901.1  These newcomers, mostly homesteaders, required roads to 
transport their produce to the nearest grain elevator.  They also expected schools for 
their children, a system of civil law adapted to the needs of prairie communities, and the 
array of government services that the provinces were beginning to provide at the turn of 
the twentieth century.  Haultain’s government was more than willing to supply all of 
this.  However, unlike most of the other provinces and American states faced with 
similar demands, the Legislative Assembly of the North-West Territories found itself 
unable to raise the necessary revenue. 
By 1903, the Legislative Assembly of the North-West Territories had acquired 
most of the powers of a provincial legislature, save one.  The Assembly, like the 
provincial legislature of Manitoba, did not have control over the management of its 
Crown lands.2  Prior to the introduction of income tax, the most lucrative source of 
provincial revenue stemmed from the rents and licensing fees that were charged to 
persons seeking to use Crown lands.  The North-West Territories had no shortage of 
Crown land, but the federal government had jurisdiction over it and the revenue from 
Crown land within the North-West flowed into the federal treasury.3  The North-West 
Territories was limited to charging a variety of fees to raise revenue and levying direct 
taxes. 
                                                 
1 The decennial census recorded an exponential population increase in the Canadian 
prairies during the settlement period. See Gerald Friesen, The Canadian Prairies: A 
History (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987), 511. 
2 Section 13 of The North-West Territories Act as amended describes the power of the 
Legislative Assembly.  See, for example, Revised Statues of Canada, 1886, c. 50, s. 13.  
3 Saskatchewan, Alberta and Manitoba did not obtain jurisdiction over Crown land until 
1930.  See The British North America Act, 1930. 
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 The government’s limited revenue sources severely handicapped its ability to 
undertake costly construction projects.4  The federal government was not wholly 
unconsciousness of the problems caused by the Territorial government’s financial 
difficulties.  Indeed, the federal budget included a yearly grant for Territorial purposes.  
Unfortunately, while the Territorial population was growing exponentially, the grant was 
not.5
The precarious financial situation of the North-West Territories affected the 
evolution of representative institutions.  Despite the arrival of responsible government, 
the members of the Assembly did not divide themselves into parties.  Each MLA, 
including Haultain, was elected upon their individual merits.  This began in 1881 when 
an elected Councillor was first added to the Council of the North-West Territories.6  
Political parties are a means of organising members of an assembly to work towards a 
common goal.  As the power of the Council was so proscribed, the organizational 
influence of political parties was considered unnecessary.  This remained the case as the 
jurisdiction of the Assembly increased during the 1890s. 
As The North-West Territories Act was a federal legislation, any reform would 
have to be undertaken by Parliament.  Haultain understood this.  Lacking jurisdiction 
                                                 
4 The North-West Territories Act never included a provision for issuing Territorial 
debentures.  The Territorial government therefore always operated without a capital 
account.  As a result, the cost of expensive building projects could not be spread across 
several fiscal years.   
5 C. Cecil Lingard, Territorial Government in Canada: The Autonomy Question in the 
Old North-West Territories (Toronto: The University of Toronto Press, 1946), 16-17. 
6 The North-West Territories Act, 1875 stipulated that elected Councillors were to be 
added to other appointed Council of the North-West Territories (the precursor of the 
Assembly) as population increased; see Statues of Canada, 1875, c. 49, s. 13 (38 Vict).  
The first such election occurred in 1881; see Lewis Herbert Thomas, The Struggle for 
Responsible Government in the North-West Territories, 1870-97 2nd ed. (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1978), 89. 
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 over the constitution of the North-West Territories, Haultain tried to influence 
Parliament by emphasizing his moral right as premier to have input into the solution.  He 
had the Assembly move several ‘memorials’ addressed to the Governor-General in 
Council.7  Haultain’s efforts to gain influence over federal policy regarding the North-
West Territories affected every aspect of how the Assembly and government were 
organized. 
Haultain built the Territorial system of non-partisanship both to consolidate 
support for his leadership and to assist him in pursuing regional grievances with the 
federal government.  In forming the first Advisory Council in 1888, Lieutenant-
Governor Joseph Royal indicated that it was important that it have the confidence of the 
Assembly, if only to prevent gossip.8  In the ensuing secret ballot, Haultain was selected 
as chairman of the council.  The members likely selected him because of his forceful 
advocacy for responsible government.  Although legally the Councillors were limited to 
allocating revenue raised by the Assembly, a steady stream of lieutenant-governors 
would depend on Haultain’s advice in a variety of matters.  Haultain was soon using his 
position to consolidate his support in the Assembly.  In doing so, he did not discriminate 
between those who identified either with the Liberal Party or the Conservative Party. 
A formal party never took shape, but most members could be identified as either 
supporters or critics of Haultain’s administration.  Liberals like James Hamilton Ross 
and George H.V. Bulyea allied themselves with Haultain, a Conservative whose 
platform they could accept.  By aligning themselves with Haultain, these men gained 
                                                 
7 In 1903, the memorials were printed at the request of the Assembly in Journal of the 
Legislative Assembly of the North-West Territories, 1st Session, 5th Legislature (Regina: 
R.B. Gordon, 1903), Appendix, 1-73. 
8 Thomas, The Struggle for Responsible Government in the North-West Territories, 161. 
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 access to the corridors of power.  Haultain, on the other hand, gained several competent 
and well-connected ministers.  Non-partisanship greatly aided Haultain, to a point, in 
negotiating with the federal government. 
Haultain and his supporters equated non-partisanship with unanimity.  To oppose 
the government’s policies was not just to oppose Haultain, but the will of the Territorial 
electorate.  Allowances were made for partisanship in the federal sphere.  Although free 
to vote their conscience in the Assembly, Conservatives and Liberals campaigned for 
their respective causes in federal elections.9  Still, ministers avoided commenting on 
Territorial issues and abstained from criticizing one another.  While this could make 
Territorial elections a little colourless, it kept the government in office. 
Acceptance of this method of governing the region was far from universal. 
Conservatives especially chafed under the ‘non-partisan’ regime.  R.B. Bennett loathed 
both Haultain and his ‘non-partisanship.’  In a letter to federal Conservative leader 
Robert Borden, Bennett complained that Haultain was not using the patronage at his 
disposal to build a Conservative organization.  He pointed out how the government had 
dismissed several Conservatives from the clerkship of a district court, appointing a 
Liberal instead.  Writing to Borden, Bennett explained in frustration that: 
It is idle for us to attempt to understand Haultain’s ways. … The assurances of 
fealty to a leader and loyalty to a party count in my judgement for very little 
when the visible evidence of that fealty and loyalty advances the interests of the 
opposing party.10
 
                                                 
9 See Thomas discussion of the organization of the first Territorial executive. Thomas, 
The Struggle for Responsible Government in the North-West Territories, 1870-97, 205-
207. 
10 National Archives of Canada, R.B. Bennett Papers, Vol. 877, Reel M314, pp 545724-
5, Bennett to Borden, March 10th, 1903. 
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 Bennett would be the first of many Conservatives to wonder why Haultain did not build 
Conservative support while his Liberal colleagues took care to build support for their 
party.  It was within this political dynamic that Haultain attempted to resolve the 
Territory’s fiscal crisis.  
The North-West Territories' precarious finances were difficult to accept given the 
success of the western settlement policy, the cornerstone of Canada’s economic policy.  
The prairie economy provided both the raw materials for central Canadian factories and 
a market for these manufactured goods.  The North-West Territories and Rupert’s Land 
were acquired by Canada from the British Government and the Hudson’s Bay Company 
in 1870.11  The Laurier government pushed immigration aggressively after 1896, making 
western development a key initiative of the administration.  Federal Minister of the 
Interior Clifford Sinton’s settlement policy was at its zenith—the number of people in 
the Territories had more than doubled in ten years.12
Starting in 1891, the jurisdiction of the Assembly was periodically expanded by 
Parliament with the expectation that it would assume responsibility for local 
administration.  By 1902 the Assembly exercised all the major powers of a provincial 
legislature.13  Still, Haultain pointed out that “we have not the power to borrow money; 
we have not the power to deal with the public domain”—in other words, management of 
Crown Lands. 14  The Territorial government was expected to provide a public school 
                                                 
11 The British North America Act, 1867 describes the method by with the North West 
Territories were to be admitted to the Union. 
12 Friesen, The Canadian Prairies, Appendix, Table 4. 
13 The North-West Territories Act, unedited office consolidation to 1 September 1905 
(Regina: Queen’s Printer, 2002), sec 13-16. 
14 North-West Territories, Legislative Assembly, “Constitutional and Financial 
Questions affecting the North-West Territories: Speech of F.W.G. Haultain (Attorney 
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 system; construct and repair bridges, culverts, ferries, dams and reservoirs; survey and 
build roads; bore public wells; construct fire guards; exterminate pests and noxious 
weeds; and give grants to hospitals and asylums.  Prior to the introduction of income tax, 
rents and licensing fees derived from Crown land formed the bulk of a province’s 
revenue.  This problem was compounded by the Territorial inability to issue bonds 
which prevented the government from spreading the expense of capital projects across 
multiple budgets.  Lacking the ability to raise additional revenue, the Government of the 
North-West Territories was in an increasingly precarious financial situation as expenses 
outstripped income. 
Haultain believed that the relationship between the North-West Territories and 
the federal government was analogous to the relationship between a colony and the 
Imperial Government.  The Colonial Office in London had believed that public lands 
should be administered in the Imperial interest and instructed its governors accordingly.  
In both cases, the higher level of government had borne the expense of opening the 
colony up for settlement.  Should the imperial authority not expect some compensation 
as a result?  Haultain realized that “the immigrant was a distinct asset to the Dominion 
and, at the same time, a distinct liability to the Territories, with their increased need for 
local improvements.”15  Originally, Haultain believed that the simplest solution to the 
problem was to amend the North-West Territories Act to give the Territories the rents 
                                                                                                                                                
General of the Territories) in the Legislative Assembly on Wednesday the Second day of 
May, 1900” 2 May 1900. (Regina: John Alexander Reid, Queen’s Printer, 1900), 4-5; 
Glenbow Archives, Haultain fonds, Box 1, file 17. 
15 F.W.G. Haultain, interview with C.C. Lingard Dec. 1937, quoted in C. Cecil Lingard, 
Territorial Government in Canada: The Autonomy Question in the Old North-West 
Territories (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1946; reprint, Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 1978), 9.   
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 from Crown lands or a dependable grant.  Pursuing better financial terms for the 
Territories was the goal of his government after 1897.  Haultain’s repeated attempt to 
arrange a meeting with Laurier and the ministers of Finance and of the Interior were 
unsuccessful.  It was becoming clear to him that the federal government did not consider 
the government of the North-West Territories’ impeding insolvency an issue.  He 
reasoned that if the Territories were granted provincial autonomy, the provincial 
government would possess the jurisdiction to solve the fiscal crisis. 
Haultain therefore drafted a petition that was subsequently endorsed by the 
Assembly.  It requested the Governor-General in Council to “order inquiries to be made 
… with a view to the settlement of the terms and conditions upon which the Territories 
or any portion thereof shall be established as a Province.”16  Haultain had decided that 
the Territorial system of government was unworkable and that federal indifference to the 
Territory’s impending financial crisis had become intolerable. 
Shortly after the Lieutenant-Governor had forwarded the petition to the Secretary 
of State, Haultain tried to arrange a meeting with the relevant federal ministers to discuss 
the situation.  Six months passed without a response.  Haultain and James Hamilton 
Ross, the Territorial Treasurer and Commissioner of Public Works, went to Ottawa in 
January 1901 to explain the gravity of the situation to Clifford Sifton, the Minister of the 
Interior.  Sifton was the logical person to approach because the Department of the 
Interior was responsible for the North-West Territories.  It was also a shrewd move on 
Haultain’s part: as a Member of Parliament from Manitoba, where he had been a 
                                                 
16 Journal of the Legislative Assembly of the North-West Territories, 5th Legislature, 1st 
Session (1903): Appendix, 1-2. 
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 member of the provincial cabinet, Sifton was likely sympathetic to their plight.17  Upon 
returning to Regina, Haultain wrote Sifton to reiterate what had been discussed:  
The Memorial … points out how, in the opinion of the Legislature, our 
legislative jurisdiction and administrative responsibilities have been enlarged and 
increased out of all proportion to the means placed at our disposal. …While 
financial embarrassments rather than constitutional aspirations have led the 
North-West Government and Legislature to discuss the provincial status I think 
that sufficient practical reasons can be given for the early establishment of 
Provincial institutions in the West.18
 
This time, Haultain’s forceful advocacy received a swift reply.19  Without 
committing to a specific policy, Sifton wrote, “the time has arrived when the question of 
organizing the Territories on the Provincial basis ought to be the subject of full 
consideration.”  The letter concluded with an invitation for Haultain to bring 
representatives of his government to Ottawa for a conference.20  The organization of a 
conference appeared to be a victory for Haultain.  Haultain’s advocacy was finally 
bearing fruit. 
The Ottawa meeting was between Haultain and Arthur Lewis Sifton, the new 
Territorial Treasurer and MLA from Banff (and Clifford’s brother), and members of the 
federal Cabinet, including Laurier and Sifton.21 It is safe to assume from Haultain’s 
                                                 
17 Manitoba suffered similar fiscal problems, as that Province also did not have control 
of its Crown land. Friesen, The Canadian Prairies, 126. 
18 Haultain’s 30 Jan. 1901 letter to Sifton in the Journal of the Legislature of the North-
West Territories, 5th Legislature, 1st Session (1903): Appendix, 6-7. 
19 Sifton forwarded his most recent correspondence with Haultain to the Prime Minister.  
There is no record of a reply.  NAC, Laurier Papers, Frederick Haultain to Clifford 
Sifton, 30 Jan 1901, 4832. 
20 Sifton’s 21 March 1901 letter to Haultain in the Journal of the Legislative Assembly of 
the North-West Territories, 5th Legislature, 1st Session (1903): Appendix, 6-7. 
21 Cabinet committee meetings were constituted ad hoc and semi-formally before the 
Second World War.  It appears to have been considered unnecessary to tax the limited 
resources of the Privy Council Office by keeping minutes.  In this case, there is some 
record as Laurier scribbled a few notes on the back of his copy of the memorial from the 
Assembly.  NAC, Laurier Papers, North-West Autonomy, 24. 
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 correspondence that the discussion was far reaching, encompassing the problems and 
aspirations of the North-West Territories.  Haultain argued that the federal grant-in-aid 
was unsatisfactory.  As long as Ottawa managed Crown land in the Territories, the 
North-West was entitled to compensation based on what had been lost.  Until the North-
West was properly compensated, it would be difficult to deal with the challenges of 
rapid population growth.  The simplest way to rectify this situation was for autonomy to 
be granted. 
The cabinet committee stated that while they understood Haultain’s difficulty the 
time was perhaps not ripe for the region to enter confederation as a province.  Laurier 
asked Haultain, evidently as a stalling tactic, to submit a memorial outlining exactly why 
the Territories sought provincehood.22   If it was a stalling tactic, Haultain did not 
believe it was a counterproductive one.  He returned to Regina to begin working on the 
memo describing the Territories’ proposed solution in detail.  Given all the difficulties 
Haultain endured just to secure a meeting, he should have pressed for a commitment for 
some concrete action from Laurier’s government. 
The strength of Haultain’s position rested in his refusal to align his government 
with the Liberals or Conservatives.  Haultain cultivated a symbiotic relationship with the 
Liberal in the Legislative Assembly.  His relationship with the Liberals meant that, 
whilst a Conservative, he was protected from partisan attacks.  By 1902, all the members 
of the Haultain’s cabinet were Liberal.23  Through these men, the Members of 
                                                 
22 C. Cecil Lingard, Territorial Government in Canada: The Autonomy Question in the 
Old North-West Territories (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1946), 36-37. 
23 The Ninth Parliament was elected on November 7, 1900 and dissolved on September 
29, 1904.  The Territories sent four MPs, three Liberals and one “independent” Liberal.  
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 Parliament from the North-West Territories were quietly lobbying Laurier on Haultain’s 
behalf.  Walter Scott, the new Member for Assiniboia West, was at first especially 
helpful.  Still, the non-partisanship system had limitations.  While non-partisanship 
protected the Territorial government from partisan attack, it also limited the extent to 
which the government could challenge the federal government lest it affect the Liberals. 
Realization that the federal subsidy for the Territories would have to be 
significantly increased was not limited to Conservatives; in both the Legislative 
Assembly and the federal Parliament, Liberals supported Haultain in pressing for 
autonomy.  Indeed, in 1902, the ‘Liberal’ members of the Assembly were all strong 
supporters of the Haultain government.24  Recognizing the value of an intelligent and 
forceful voice in Parliament (and the government caucus), Haultain supported Walter 
Scott in the 1900 election over the Conservative candidate.  Scott saw Haultain as a 
friend and colleague.25  He, in turn, assisted Haultain by trying to convince Parliament 
and the cabinet of the necessity of provincial status.26  Scott was a forceful advocate.  
During the budget debate in 1901 Scott raised the issue of Territorial finances.  Scott’s 
arguments mirrored those of Haultain, demonstrating that Haultain’s influence reached 
into the Liberal caucus in Parliament.  During a debate in the House Scott argued that: 
... some different arrangement ought be made so as to enable them to better carry 
out the work of local government.  The difficulty they labour under is not so 
                                                                                                                                                
See Saskatchewan Archives Board, Saskatchewan Executive and Legislative Directory, 
December 2002, section 3.4, p. 2. 
24 The fact that political parties did not exist in the Legislative Assembly did not stop the 
individual members from supporting a party federally. D.H. Bocking, “Political 
Ambitions and Territorial Affairs,” Saskatchewan History, Vol 18, no. 2 (Spring 1965), 
63-34. 
25 Gordon L. Barnhart, Peace, Progress and Prosperity: a biography of Saskatchewan’s 
first premier T. Walter Scott (Regina: Canadian Plains Research Centre, 2000), 28-29. 
26 Bocking, “Political Ambitions and Territorial Affairs,” 63. 
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 much constitutional as it is financial. … Each of the provinces has a fixed 
financial status and the provincial subsidies are not voted by this parliament year 
after year, but are paid under statute, whereas with regard to the North-west 
Territories the grant which corresponds in a sense to the provincial subsidies has 
to be voted each session by this House.27
 
This kind of support may have caused Haultain to overestimate his position. 
Haultain completed the memorandum Laurier requested in December 1901.  It 
was a catalogue of the problems with the Territorial constitution.  Haultain mentioned 
Parliament’s failure to allocate and fix a sufficient subsidy in light of the fact that 
monies earned through the administration of the ‘public domain’ flowed to the federal 
treasury.  He mentioned how this problem was compounded by the Assembly’s inability 
to raise revenue, since it was limited to collecting licensing fees.  The lack of public 
credit forced the government to spend an overly large portion of its yearly budget on 
capital expenses.  He demonstrated that the growth in population had caused the demand 
for services to increase exponentially.  For example, there were now 649 school districts 
compared to the 436 in 1886.  The North-West Territories were expecting a deficit of at 
least $250,000 before the 1903 fiscal year was half over.  He requested an appropriation 
of $600,000 to help cover these expenses.  Haultain declared, “we seek for no advantage 
over any other Province, and we do not anticipate that we will be denied any privileges 
given elsewhere.” 28
Haultain enclosed a draft autonomy bill which proposed creating a province out 
of the entire North-West Territories.29  There were three important points in the draft 
                                                 
27 House of Commons, Debates, 1st Session, 9th Parliament (March 25, 1901), 2007. 
28  Appendix to Journals of the Legislative Assembly of the North-West Territories, 1st 
session, 1903, 8-35. 
29 Haultain to Laurier, December 7, 1901, Journals of the Legislative Assembly of the 
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 bill: the financial arrangements, the fact that jurisdiction over water would be solely 
provincial, and the size of the new province.  Management of Crown lands would be 
vested in the province.  Management of Crown lands would provide the money needed 
to administer the government.  Haultain emphasized that the principle of provincial 
ownership of public land was established in the British North American colonies by The 
Union Act of 1840.  There would also be an annual transfer payment, calculated in part 
on the amount of land granted to the railroads.  Haultain proposed that waterways would 
be provincially regulated because of irrigation’s importance to the prairie agricultural 
economy.  If jurisdiction was shared between the province and the Dominion as it was in 
the original four provinces, concurrent legislation would be necessary for irrigation.30
Haultain’s draft bill also proposed that the entire North-West Territories should 
form a single province.  He believed that the North-West had a single economic and 
political identity.  Knowing that Laurier doubted that such a large area could be 
administered effectively from Regina, Haultain pointed out that the North-West was 
already being administered from Regina.  He added that the majority of the population 
would come to reside in the southern half of the province, as the northern half was 
inhospitable and thus require minimal government activity. 
Opposing multiple provinces was the first of Haultain’s mistakes.  The number 
of provinces that should be formed out of the North-West Territories was an issue 
debated repeatedly in the Assembly.  For example, Haultain rewrote a portion of the 
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 1900 petition to the Governor General when fellow MLA R.B. Bennett objected to 
language suggesting the creation of a single province in favour of more ambiguous 
language.31  By the turn of the twentieth century, district consciousness was emerging as 
a significant political force.32  In an era before automobiles, the sheer distance separating 
most communities dissuaded most from unnecessary travel within the North-West 
Territories.  Indeed, the premier himself rarely ventured outside Regina.  Most electors 
therefore identified themselves more closely with their district than the whole region.  
Non-partisanship likely heightened local sympathies as each MLA campaigned largely 
on local issues.  Haultain seemed unwilling or unable to alter his plans to accommodate 
the desire for two or more provinces. 
Although Laurier received Haultain’s letter in late December, he did not deal 
with it promptly.  Indeed, while Haultain had successfully captured Ottawa’s attention, 
he had yet to incite any sizeable interest in autonomy.  Winter passed to spring without a 
reply; Laurier blamed his inaction on Sinton’s absence from the capital due to a 
prolonged illness.33  If Laurier had considered autonomy important, it is doubtful 
whether he would have waited so long.  The autonomy question was a constitutional one 
and not within the Interior portfolio per se; as the ‘western minister,’ Sinton’s input was 
valuable, but it would not have violated any constitutional conventions to begin 
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 discussions without the Minister of the Interior.  Laurier probably still felt that action 
was still premature. 
On 26 April 1902, Haultain advised the lieutenant-governor to dissolve the 
Assembly for an election on May 21.34  Haultain called the election specifically to 
secure a mandate to negotiate autonomy.  A May election would coincide with seeding 
and participating in a campaign would be a major inconvenience for farmers.  That 
Haultain risked offending farmers demonstrates how pressing autonomy was.  The 
governing coalition fought the election solely on the issue of immediate provincial 
autonomy for the North-West Territories.  The campaign was short and uneventful.  All 
candidates agreed on the issues at stake: the Territories should be reorganized as a 
province to deal with the immediate fiscal crisis.  The disagreement was whether the 
premier had done everything he could to impress upon the federal cabinet the magnitude 
of the problem, and on the number of provinces that should be created. 
The Legislature that was returned on May 21 contained a comfortable majority 
of Haultain supporters and only a handful of allies for Brett and Bennett, the two most 
prominent members opposed to Haultain’s government in the assembly.  Given the 
system of government in the Territories, it could reasonably be considered a landslide 
for Haultain and his fight for immediate western autonomy.  Haultain planned to utilize 
his renewed support to take the issue again to the federal government.  Still, his 
tremendous victory contained the seeds of disunity and disaster. 
Unbeknownst to Haultain, Richard Bedford Bennett, a self-declared 
Conservative partisan, was plotting with the Conservatives in Ottawa to introduce party 
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 politics to the Legislative Assembly.  Bennett thought parties were a vital part of the 
British parliamentary system and regarded non-partisanship as a nearly autocratic 
system.  Non-partisanship did not, after all, provide room for an organised ‘loyal 
opposition’ to the government.  The fact that Haultain purported to be a Conservative 
only further raised the ire of the ‘partisan’ Conservatives, including their self-appointed 
Territorial leader Richard Bedford Bennett.35
Searching for an issue which could distinguish the Conservatives from the 
Liberals, Robert Borden, Conservative Leader in the House of Commons, latched onto 
autonomy for the North-West Territories.  Bennett had been lobbying Borden to 
comment on the constitutional status of the North-West Territories.  Borden called for a 
Territorial convention of Conservatives to organize a Conservative Party to fight the 
next election.  Such a convention held the potential to make autonomy a partisan issue 
and upset the delicate balance between Liberals and Conservatives upon which 
Haultain’s government depended.  Still, if Haultain believed that a Conservative 
convention would cause friction between Territorial Liberals and Conservatives, he did 
not believe it would threaten his position.  As it turned out, the bonds that held his 
government together were more fragile than he anticipated. 
When the first session of the fifth Legislature began in April 1903, the members 
were restless.  The Assembly’s first topic of discussion was autonomy.  Shrewdly 
demonstrating his understanding of Haultain’s popularity, Bennett accused the members 
of the cabinet of misleading the Premier.  Bennett suggested that the 1902 election was 
held at the behest of the Liberal members of the cabinet in order to increase the number 
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 of Liberal members in the Assembly and thus their hold on power.  Bennett was soon 
discredited as Haultain explained that the autonomy issue had to be dealt with 
immediately.36  Bennett was not finished. 
Robert Borden desperately needed an issue where he could carve out a distinct 
position from the Liberals, and Bennett convinced Borden that autonomy for the West 
was a winning issue.  A federal election was fast approaching.  The West was so firmly 
in favour of autonomy that westerners would shift their support to the Conservative 
Party if it was in favour of autonomy.  Conservative support of autonomy would destroy 
non-partisanship.  After all, how could Haultain continue to ‘sit on the fence’ by 
claiming to be non-partisan if the Conservatives adopted the key plank of his 
government’s platform?  In such an instance, Haultain could not refuse to support 
Borden over Laurier without reversing his own position.  Borden declared himself in 
favour of immediate autonomy, sponsoring a resolution in the House of Commons to 
that effect.37  Then, upon the advice of Bennett, he advised the western Conservatives to 
fight the next Territorial election as a party.  To fulfill this goal, Borden called a 
convention of western Conservatives to organize a Conservative Party capable of 
running candidates in the next Territorial election.38
Whatever his faults, R.B. Bennett was an excellent political organizer.  Haultain 
seems to have been working behind the scenes to thwart Bennett by trying to stack the 
convention with delegates who favoured non-partisanship.  Bennett reported to Borden 
that, “Mr. Haultain’s friends had steadily worked in the hope of inducing a considerable 
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 number of delegates to vote against any resolution favouring the introduction of party 
politics into the legislature.”39  Haultain’s fair-weather support of the Conservative Party 
made him no match for Bennett in obtaining the support of Conservative party members.  
Bennett quickly outmanoeuvred Haultain and when the convention met in Moose Jaw, 
Haultain had already lost.  Still, the premier decided to participate in the convention’s 
proceedings.  The convention passed eight motions; the seventh threatened the survival 
of the Haultain government.  It stated that Conservative candidates should be nominated 
for every constituency at the next general election of Members to the Legislative 
Assembly of the North-west Territories.40  The convention concluded by electing 
Haultain to the honorary presidency of the Territorial Conservative Party. 
Haultain may have attended because the convention endorsed his vision for 
autonomy.  Still, there was no way for a non-partisan premier to participate in a party 
convention called to introduce partisanship in the Assembly without alienating many of 
the government’s supporters.  Haultain may have remained at the convention because it 
was obvious that the Conservatives were going to adopt his autonomy policy.  The 
Conservative platform adopted by the convention was focused exclusively on obtaining 
autonomy.  This small victory came at a high price.  Haultain’s behaviour threatened the 
stability of his government.  Haultain’s cabinet colleagues, all Liberals, were wary of 
Haultain’s motives in attending the convention.  Haultain explained that he was not 
bound by the results of the convention; the government needed the confidence of the 
Assembly, not the Conservative party, to continue.  He therefore had no intention of 
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 discontinuing the non-partisan tradition.  The Liberals, especially George Bulyea, were 
less than convinced. 
This tension did not prevent the cabinet from working together on the annual 
budget.  The federal budget would be presented soon and the size of the federal grant 
would determine Territorial budgetary priorities.  In addition to the pressure exerted by 
rapid population growth, an unexpected spring flood had destroyed many roads and 
bridges.  These urgently needed repairs presented an additional financial burden as this 
would need to be done before harvest.  Haultain and George H.V. Bulyea, the Territorial 
Secretary and Commissioner of Public Works, began lobbying Ottawa for an increase in 
the grant.41
By 1903, Bulyea was the leading Liberal in the North-West Territories and 
almost Haultain’s equal in the cabinet.  Bulyea had acquired a tremendous amount of 
personal influence with the federal Liberals, particularly Laurier.  Bulyea was Laurier’s 
eyes and ears on Territorial matters and Laurier used his knowledge to evaluate the 
Conservatives in the Legislature, particularly Haultain.42  Despite his close relationship 
with Laurier, Bulyea was not a Liberal spy.  Haultain was likely aware of Bulyea’s 
relationship with Laurier and, in light of the access Bulyea had to the Prime Minister, 
probably approved.43  When Haultain wrote the prime minister and finance minister 
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 requesting additional monies, Bulyea lobbied hard for an increase in the grant utilizing 
his connections in the Liberal party. 
Their combined efforts paid off when Bulyea and Haultain obtained a sizeable 
increase in the grant for the 1903 fiscal year.  The $957,979 grant was almost double the 
preceding year’s assistance.  Even more significantly, the Territories received 85 percent 
of the requested amount.44  Haultain had repeatedly stated that autonomy was 
unnecessary if a permanent solution to the North-West’s financial problems could be 
found.  A grant of this size, so easily obtained, went a long way to satisfying Haultain’s 
request for stable funding. 
The cabinet started falling apart that fall when, during the annual budget speech, 
Haultain refused to ask the Assembly to appropriate the federal grant-in-aid.  Haultain 
explained that he was doing this in protest to the restriction that the federal government 
had placed on the money’s use.  Parliament had stipulated that the grant could not be 
used to cover an overdraft from the previous fiscal year, much to Haultain’s dismay.  
Haultain argued that the government should be allowed to use the money to pay 
outstanding bills; bills that could not be paid as the government had literally run out of 
money.  Haultain objected to the Territories being dealt with in such a harsh manner.  “I 
need hardly remind you that the Territories are not a Province, and that they do not enjoy 
the revenues or powers of a Province, and further that it is the opinion of the 
Government and Legislature of the Territories that the ‘liberal allowances’ you provide 
is not liberal enough to establish an analogy.”45  Haultain felt that the only way to make 
                                                 
44 Lingard, Territorial Government in Canada, Table V, 258.   
45 Haultain to Fielding, June 15, 1903 in Journals of the North-West Territories, 1st 
Session, 5th Legislature, Appendix, 52. 
 31
 this point with the federal government was to embarrass the federal ministry.  For some 
reason, Haultain did not share his decision with his cabinet colleagues before making a 
public announcement. 
Bulyea was livid and immediately threatened to resign.46  Strangely, Haultain did 
not anticipate Bulyea’s resignation.  In announcing his decision not to allocate the grant, 
Haultain had humiliated his most important supporter by embarrassing the federal 
government.  Bulyea had placed his reputation with Laurier on the line to get the grant.  
As Territorial Secretary and Haultain’s deputy, Bulyea reasonably assumed that he 
would have input into Haultain’s decisions.  The Liberals in Haultain’s cabinet now 
wondered if they were being used to humiliate the federal government.  Believing that 
Bulyea’s resignation was a personal attack, Haultain refused to discuss the situation with 
him.  This standoff between the two key members of the cabinet frightened the 
government’s supporters in the Assembly.  The government’s supporters believed that if 
either Haultain or Bulyea withdrew from cabinet the government would likely collapse.  
The government’s reliance on the support of Bulyea and his Liberal colleagues 
demonstrates that the government was no longer non-partisan but a coalition—a 
coalition that was being torn in two over its leading member’s policies on autonomy.  
An agreement was mediated between Haultain and Bulyea—the grant would be included 
in the budget—but their relationship was now quite strained. 
Bulyea’s correspondence with Laurier demonstrated a darker view of Haultain.  
Bulyea was convinced that Haultain refused to allocate the grant money in an effort to 
bolster Conservative support.  Perhaps it was intended to provide an excuse to introduce 
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 partisanship into the Assembly.  It may have been this particular incident that ultimately 
caused Bulyea’s recommendation against Haultain’s appointment to the premiership of 
Saskatchewan in 1905.  It is more likely that Haultain had completely misjudged the 
situation.  Haultain believed that the Liberals’ loyalty to his government would have 
outweighed their loyalty to Laurier.  The truth was that Bulyea and his supporters were 
all too involved in the Liberal party to be immune to attacks directed against Liberals.  
By 1903, it was an open secret that the Liberal members of the cabinet were using the 
patronage at their disposal to fortify the position of the Liberal party.47  Haultain had 
failed to build the equivalent loyalty among Conservatives or to organise a third party.  
If forced to choose between Haultain and the Liberal party, Bulyea and the other 
ministers would choose the Liberals. 
Despite having lost the confidence of his cabinet, Haultain could not be easily 
discarded.  He was well regarded by North-Westerners, as was his philosophy of non-
partisanship.  Haultain may have been a poor politician, but he was an excellent 
campaigner.  The media attributed Haultain’s failings to bad advice from corrupt 
officials and narrow-minded backbenchers.  Haultain’s elegant speeches in which he 
described the Territories’ bright future were always well received.  Although the 
collation was cracking, Haultain still maintained widespread popular support that 
crossed party lines and that made him a threat to the Liberals.  The Liberals simply did 
not have a leader comparable to Haultain. 
Towards the end of 1903, Haultain made it known to his friend James Hamilton 
Ross, a prominent Liberal and former MLA, that he was exhausted and thinking about 
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 retiring from politics.48  Ross apparently spread the word and Territorial Liberals were 
soon contemplating a future without Haultain.  This could be an immense opportunity: 
there was no obvious heir to Haultain’s leadership.  There certainly was no Conservative 
in the Assembly who was viewed as Haultain’s successor; Haultain himself made sure of 
that.  If Haultain retired, the succeeding premier would likely be a Liberal.  Indeed, 
Haultain was the only member of the cabinet without Liberal sympathies.  His 
resignation would therefore cause the government to become Liberal in all but name.  
Introducing partisanship to the Assembly would cause little difficulty, for the Liberal 
party at least. 
The federal Justice Minister offered to appoint Haultain to the Supreme Court of 
the North-West Territories.  Haultain did not turn down the offer right away.  Handling 
both trials and appeals, the Supreme Court was the equivalent to a provincial superior 
court.  Haultain was quite proud of his career as a barrister and solicitor, more so than 
his political career.  Appointment as a justice of a superior court was a high honour so 
Haultain was quite flattered by the offer.  The fact that he was offered such an important 
position, one that was traditionally reserved for an experienced solicitor and partisan 
Liberal, spoke both to the regard in which he was held and the threat that the federal 
government thought he could potentially pose to Liberal hegemony.  Haultain however 
put off his decision, seeking to discuss it with his friends and constituents in Fort 
Macleod. 
                                                 
48 Ross had served in Haultain’s Cabinet until 1902 when he was appointed Gold 
Commissioner of the Yukon Territory.  In December of 1902, he had been elected as the 
first Member of Parliament from the Yukon Territory.   
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 Discussing the offer publicly was a huge mistake.  Offers of official 
appointments are made in confidence under the British-Canadian constitutional tradition.  
This offer was all the more sensitive because of the motive behind it.  In the coming 
weeks, Haultain discussed the offer with so many people that it because almost public 
knowledge in Fort Macleod.  Ultimately deciding to continue as premier, Haultain’s 
very public rejection of the offer embarrassed and infuriated the Liberals.  Some 
Liberals had gone to great lengths to obtain this position for Haultain.  Many even 
suggested that Haultain had publicly rejected the appointment to embarrass their party.  
With Liberal faith in Haultain now completely destroyed, the non-partisan movement 
effectively ended.  George Bulyea especially started to believe that Haultain was now 
using his position to bolster support for the Conservative Party.  Bulyea’s began 
manoeuvring to protect the Liberals and oust Haultain. 
As 1904 approached, the Ottawa Liberals became convinced that autonomy must 
soon be granted.  The North-West Territories, especially the southern districts of 
Assiniboia and Alberta, were being settled rapidly.  If provincehood was not granted, 
some other financial settlement would have to be reached to ensure the solvency of the 
Territorial government.  The federal cabinet concluded that autonomy was the best 
solution.  Parliament was dissolved in September 1904.  In the ensuing election 
campaign, the prime minister committed himself to autonomy for the North-West if he 
was returned to power.49  Laurier and the Liberals were determined to sideline the 
increasingly uncooperative Haultain and take credit for the creation of the new 
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 provinces.  They shrewdly left the discussion of the contents of the new provincial 
constitutions to the post-election negotiations with the Territorial executive. 
The Liberals in the North-West Territories, including those in the Assembly, 
lined up behind Laurier.  Meanwhile, Haultain campaigned for Conservative leader 
Robert Borden, a ridiculous mistake.  With both parties now favouring autonomy, 
Haultain could have safely remained non-partisan by declaring his intention to work 
with whoever was elected.  By alienating the Liberals in his Cabinet, Haultain lost the 
position from which he had thus far been negotiating.  The Liberals had effectively 
neutralized the one advantage that the Conservatives had in the North-West, namely an 
autonomy plank in their platform.  Over the past decade, Haultain had watched 
sympathies in the Legislature turn from predominantly Conservative to Liberal.50  The 
Liberals were well organized.  Bulyea was in correspondence with other Liberals and 
using many of the patronage powers of the government to organize a Liberal “machine.”  
The Conservatives, on the other hand, were busy fighting among themselves.  The 
bombastic and unpredictable R.B. Bennett caused as much trouble for his party as he did 
for Haultain.  Bennett had to compete with the charismatic Haultain for the support of 
many Conservatives.  Haultain was still working hard for the principles of non-partisan 
administration.  Indeed, although they never competed directly against each other, it is 
likely that they each bled energy and talent from the other’s campaign. 
Soon after being returned to power, Laurier sent word to Haultain that autonomy 
would be the first order of business for the new Parliament.  Haultain had to be 
consulted to placate public opinion.  After consulting his now divided cabinet, Haultain 
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 agreed to travel to Ottawa with Bulyea to negotiate the details of the new provincial 
constitution with Laurier.  Haultain did not realize that Laurier was not negotiating with 
him, but trying to decide how best to deal with the western premier.  Having alienated 
his key supporters, Haultain no longer had any influence over the autonomy settlement.  








A new Constitution, whether you like it or not! 
 
Three years of federal inaction came to an end when the 10th Parliament of 
Canada convened in January 1905.  During the throne speech, the governor-general 
confirmed Laurier’s campaign promise when he said that: “the rapid growth in the 
population of the North-West Territories during the past two years justifies the wisdom 
of conferring on these Territories provincial autonomy.  A bill for that purpose will be 
submitted for your consideration”.1  A few days later, Prime Minister Wilfrid Laurier 
himself introduced Bill 69, An Act to establish and provide for the government of the 
Province of Alberta.2  As Frederick Haultain watched from a place of honour on the 
floor of the House, he must have believed that he was witnessing the enactment of his 
autonomy policy.  He sincerely believed that the West spoke with a single voice-–his 
voice.  However, when Saskatchewan and Alberta became provinces in September, it 
was Laurier’s vision of western autonomy that came to fruition.  Haultain’s weak 
position within his own cabinet ensured that he no longer had the influence to challenge 
                                                 
1 Debates, Senate of Canada, January 12, 1905, 20.  
2 The Saskatchewan Act was introduced immediately afterwards as Bill 70 with the 
explanation that the bills were identical in all every provision except in their description 
of the boundaries for the two provinces.  See Debates, House of Commons, Canada, 21 
February 1905, 1459. 
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 Laurier.  Haultain’s weakness became particularly apparent on 12 September 1905 when 
Lieutenant-Governor Amédée Forget called on Walter Scott, not Haultain, to form 
Saskatchewan’s first government.  Haultain and non-partisanship were spent forces that 
proved impotent at resisting the Liberal ascendancy in the new province of 
Saskatchewan.  His difficulties at the end of 1904 were rooted in his inability to come to 
terms with the reality that he no longer was the sole spokesperson for western affairs. 
Haultain wanted to ensure that the prairie economy would grow and, above all, 
that the new province would be solvent.  He believed that the agricultural economy 
would flourish if the province had jurisdiction over agriculture and settlement.  For 
example, Haultain proposed, as he had done before to Laurier, that irrigation be a 
provincial matter.3  While Haultain’s proposal did not follow the 1867 divisions of 
powers to the letter, it did ensure that jurisdiction over agriculture was provincial.  His 
draft bills specifically stated that any interest in Crown land that was not specifically 
identified as necessary to perform a federal activity be transferred to the new province.4  
This meant that any royalties due to the Crown for the use of its land would be paid into 
the provincial treasury.  This proposal ensured that the provincial government would be 
solvent and the provincial legislature would largely have jurisdiction over agricultural 
matters. 
In enacting provincial autonomy, Laurier was primarily concerned with 
maintaining the federal government’s jurisdiction over western settlement.  The 
                                                 
3 Due to the peculiar division of powers in the British North America Act, 1867, 
irrigation required concurrent federal and provincial legislation in the original four 
provinces.  ‘Draft Autonomy Bill’, Journal of the Legislative Assembly of the North-
West Territories, 5th Legislature, 1st Session (1903): Appendix, 19. 
4 See Sections 18-21, ‘Draft Autonomy Bills’, Journal of the Legislative Assembly of the 
North-West Territories, 5th Legislature, 1st Session (1903): Appendix, 21-22. 
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 economic boom Canada experienced between 1896 and 1912 was attributed in part to 
western settlement.  In fact, the country and the West in particular were growing so fast 
that Laurier optimistically declared that “the twentieth century belongs to Canada.”  
Laurier had staked his government’s reputation on the success of western settlement and 
took great pride in the success of colonization. 
Acceding control over Crown lands to the new provincial governments would 
threaten federal oversight of settlement.  Parliament regulated homesteading through its 
control over Crown land and the vast majority of the land in the North-West was Crown 
land.  It was this Crown land, surveyed into lots by Dominion Land Surveyors, that was 
offered to homesteaders.5  The fees and rents collected in administering this land was 
deposited in the federal treasury.  If jurisdiction over Crown land was transferred to the 
new provinces, they would gain de facto control over settlement policy. 
Haultain and Bulyea arrived in Ottawa on 4 January 1905.  They were occupied 
with negotiations with the federal ministers right up until the day before Parliament 
opened.  Lingard has described the story of these negotiations in detail.6  The Territorial 
representatives met with Prime Minister Sir Wilfrid Laurier and ministers Sir William 
Mulock, Charles Fitzpatrick and R.W. Scott.  Conspicuously absent from the 
proceedings was the Minister of the Interior, Clifford Sifton.  There are no records of 
                                                 
5 Rupert’s Land and North-West Territories Order describes the method by which the 
North-West was purchased from the Hudson’s Bay Company and transferred to Canada 
see ; The Dominion Lands Act describes how the prairies were to be surveyed into lots 
and section 33 describes how a homesteader could claim ownership of his parcel Statues 
of Canada, 35 Victoria, c 23. 
6 C. Cecil Lingard, Territorial Government in Canada, The Autonomy Question in the 
Old North-West Territories (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1946), 129-132. 
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 precisely what transpired during the meetings.7  The terms of the autonomy bills were 
hammered out at these conferences.  Sifton’s absence during these negotiations soon 
became a source of a crisis in the federal government. 
In hindsight, it is clear that Laurier had no desire to accept Haultain’s autonomy 
policy.  Unbeknownst to Haultain, while Laurier was discussing autonomy with him and 
Bulyea, he was also consulting the Territorial members of Parliament, particularly 
Walter Scott.  These Liberals likely reassured Laurier that disagreeing with Haultain on 
autonomy would not threaten the Liberal Party on the prairies.  While westerners were 
troubled by the financial crisis the Territorial government was faced with, as most were 
homesteaders, they were also passionate supporters of the western settlement policy and 
therefore Laurier’s government.  Most westerners received their homesteads under this 
policy.  Walter Scott and his colleagues in the Liberal caucus made it clear that 
autonomy had to come in a way that did not affect western settlement. 
It was this second group of advisors who Laurier largely depended on to frame 
his policy.  Scott and his colleagues impressed upon Laurier that Haultain must not be 
trusted, asserting that he was pursuing the interests of the Conservative Party and not the 
North-West Territories.8  By 1904, Scott had become a valuable member of the Liberal 
caucus and his advice was taken seriously.  He advised Laurier that the North-West 
Territories held a diversity of political opinions and that these would find most effective 
expression by dividing the North-West Territories into two provinces.  It also probably 
did not hurt that a second province could provide another source of patronage for Liberal 
                                                 
7 Laurier stated that no records were kept because the appointment of a secretary seemed 
unnecessary.  See Debates, House of Common of Canada, 15 March 1905, 2504. 
8 Gordon Barnhart, “Peace, Progress and Prosperity:” A biography of Saskatchewan’s 
first premier, T. Walter Scott (Regina: Canadian Plains Research Centre, 2000), 31. 
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 supporters.  It was under these circumstances that Sir Charles Fitzpatrick wrote the final 
drafts of the Autonomy bill on the 19 and 20 of February. 
Laurier disagreed with Haultain on four major issues surrounding provincial 
autonomy.  These issues were: the number of provinces that should be formed from the 
Territories; whether administration of Crown lands should be vested in the federal or 
provincial governments; the financial terms that the new provinces would be given; and 
the role that minority religious groups would play in the public school system.9
Believing that his cabinet was behind him, Laurier argued for two provinces 
divided along the fourth meridian and stretching from the international boundary 
dividing Canada from the United Stated to the 60 degrees latitude.  To ensure that 
autonomy could not affect settlement policy, Laurier proposed that the Ministry of the 
Interior maintain jurisdiction over Crown lands.  To compensate for the lack of the most 
lucrative source of provincial revenue, Laurier proposed, in addition to the standard 
transfer payments, an additional payment based on a per-capita assessment of the 
province.  Laurier also proposed reinstating the 1875 territorial school system.10   
Haultain believed that the settlement would see the present North-West 
Territories continue as a province.  He believed that a single province with jurisdiction 
over natural resources—and the lucrative source of revenue that came with this 
control—could most efficiently manage the growth of the Canadian West and therefore 
fulfil the confederation compact.  Believing that westerners agreed on most political 
questions unanimously, Haultain feared that dividing the Territories into two provinces 
was an attempt to prevent the West from becoming a significant power.  He believed 
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 that the financial terms should be roughly equivalent to those granted the original four 
provinces in 1867.  Finally, Haultain campaigned strenuously for a “national school 
system” based on consistent standards and methods of instruction throughout Buffalo 
(his name for the new province) and Canada.  The aim of such a system was to endow 
pupils with the technical skills necessary to become economically productive and 
assimilate newcomers into British-Canadian culture.11
Haultain was stunned when he realized the level of disagreement with Laurier on 
these issues and made his complaints public almost immediately.  He wrote an open 
letter to Laurier outlining the flaws in the current autonomy bills.12  It was stunning how 
much support Haultain failed to muster in rejecting the prime minister’s plan.  The 
western newspapers—nearly all now owned by Liberals—praised Laurier’s policy.  In 
the immediate aftermath of Haultain’s public statements, they ignored the western 
premier.  Editorials from all parts of the proposed province of Saskatchewan proclaimed 
the justice of the settlement.  Despite their previous support for Haultain, the editorial 
board of the Saskatoon Phenix declared that the “provision for the administration of new 
provinces seems fair.”13  Even the few Conservative newspapers preferred to speculate 
on which city would become the capital of the new provinces rather than if two would 
be better than one.14
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 By this point, George Bulyea, Haultain’s partner in the cabinet, no longer 
believed that Haultain spoke for the North-West Territories.  By 1903, Bulyea was the 
de facto leader of the Liberal Party in the North-West Territories.  Laurier consulted 
with him before distributing patronage in the North-West Territories.  Without Bulyea’s 
continued support, the government would probably have collapsed in 1903 during the 
crisis over the federal advance.15  That it did not was a testament to the self-interest of 
the Liberals.  In 1903, Haultain’s support in the Assembly was still quite strong.  Had 
the government collapsed, Haultain most likely could have gathered the support to form 
a Conservative government.  There is no evidence that Bulyea and Laurier were working 
in concert against Haultain.  Whatever the level of communication between the two 
Liberals, it is clear that Laurier’s plan had Bulyea’s support. 
This division within the territorial cabinet marked the beginning of Haultain’s 
fall from power and demonstrated the futility of continuing his struggle with Laurier.  
No one contested Parliament’s legal capacity to establish the new provincial 
constitutions.16  However, Haultain always asserted that the Legislative Assembly of the 
North-West Territories had a moral right to draw up the terms of autonomy.  After all, 
every other province had some control over the terms of its constitution.  By accepting 
Haultain's and Bulyea’s participation in the final negotiations, was Laurier not implicitly 
acknowledging this fact?  The Assembly, however, now had a majority of “Liberals,” a 
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 fact that would become clear after the 1905 provincial elections.  Laurier would have 
been aware of this situation. 
Laurier was finding it difficult to defend the education clauses in the autonomy 
bills.  The autonomy bills would have reintroduced the education system established in 
the North-West Territories Act, 1875.  The Act described a framework in which separate 
and public school boards would coexist.17   This system was intended, in part, to 
empower an anglophone or francophone linguistic minority in any given district within 
Saskatchewan to administer their own schools and included the power to set an 
independent curriculum. 
Haultain’s government had slowly shut down the separate school system as 
Parliament ceded jurisdiction over education to the Assembly.  The majority of the 
settlers that came west in the 1880s and 1890s self-identified as ‘British’.  Their 
nationalism, combined with the belief that a nation-state had room only for a single 
culture if it was to thrive, led many protestant anglophones to advocate the assimilation 
of minorities.18  By 1904, the ‘separate schools’ in the North-West Territories were 
predominantly French-Catholic and their pupils were instructed in the French language 
to the extent that the law permitted.  The francophone community considered separate 
schools to be its most important (and only remaining) right.  Was Canada not a 
bicultural nation?  The Catholic Bishops of Quebec agreed and placed a great deal of 
pressure on Laurier to entrench the right to separate schools in the new provincial 
constitutions.  Laurier felt obliged to do so, lest he alienate Liberal support in Quebec. 
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 The second issue that concerned Haultain was continued federal control over 
natural resources.  Laurier and Sifton agreed that maintaining federal control over public 
lands was necessary to facilitate the colonization of western Canada; they feared that if 
the Prairie Provinces gained control, they would radically change homesteading policy.  
Haultain thought that equality between the provinces was more crucial to maintaining a 
successful settlement policy.  Given the success and popularity of the settlement policy, 
it is unlikely that any provincial government would have sought changes to it.  Still, 
Laurier decided to play it safe. 
Haultain disagreed, arguing that the British North America Act, 1867 created a 
precedent that must be respected.  The “Management and Sale of the Public Lands 
belonging to the Province and of the Timber and Wood thereon” was among the original 
provincial powers.19  In justifying his draft autonomy bill in 1903 against the 
background of the Territorial fiscal crisis, Haultain emphasized that the majority of 
provincial revenue was derived from the management of Crown property.  Haultain had 
been seeking provincial autonomy with the specific intention of stabilizing public 
finances. 
Laurier argued that the terms by which Rupert’s Land and the North-West 
Territories had become part of Canada justified his policy.  The North-West was 
purchased from the Hudson’s Bay Company by the Canadian government.  The 
infrastructure that facilitated settlement—the railway and the North-West Mounted 
Police—had been paid for from the federal funds.  Laurier believed that the whole of the 
Canadian people, not only westerners, had both a right to administer the colonization 
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 policy they paid for and a right to profit from it.  Many settlers, who had benefited 
directly from the homesteading policy, may have agreed. 
Laurier and Haultain also disagreed over whether agriculture, the most important 
economic activity on the prairies, would be regulated federally or provincially in the 
new provinces.  Western farmers required an efficient system to transport their product 
to market, the ability to administer a system of civil law in the producers’ interest, and 
control over irrigation.  All these matters were now effectively vested in the federal 
government.  The source of the region’s inequality, in Haultain’s mind, was the inability 
of the provinces to control these vital areas of jurisdiction.  Today it is this inability to 
control the means of production that is the fountainhead for much western alienation.  
While the provinces currently possess jurisdiction over Agriculture, it is subject to 
federal paramountcy.20  By virtue of the region’s small size, Haultain sensed that the 
West would never be able to control its own destiny.21
Laurier and Haultain also disagreed on the number of provinces that should be 
created.  Laurier believed that the North-West should be divided into two separate 
provinces.  Solicitor-General Rodolphe Lemieux defended Ottawa’s position explaining 
that two provinces were necessary to maintain “the balance of confederation”.22  Due to 
the rapidly swelling population, Laurier feared that it would be impossible to govern 
such a large geographical area from Regina.  In time, governing a large and diverse 
                                                 
20 In the event of an inconsistency or conflict between federal and provincial agricultural 
legislation, the provincial Act is void.  See Section 95, The British North America Act, 
1867. 
21 Roger Gibbons, “Political Discontent in the Prairie West” in The Prairie West, 
Historical Readings, 2nd ed., ed R.D. Francis and Howard Palmer (Edmonton: Pica Pica 
Press, 1992), 690. 
22 Debates, House of Commons, Canada, March 28, 1905, Column 3310. 
 47
 population would compound this problem.  Laurier may also have been concerned with 
maximizing the potential sources of Liberal patronage by adding a second government.  
Haultain, on the other hand, believed that the North-West Territories had become a 
single economic and cultural group and therefore should become a single province.  
Through shared history, the North-West Territories had developed a unique identity.  
Two or more provinces would therefore create unnecessary duplication as two separate 
provincial governments would implement nearly identical policies. 
Opinion was not as unanimous as Haultain thought.  Many electors in the district 
of Alberta supported the idea of two provinces.  In Alberta, agriculture was already 
beginning to diversify away from ranching into mixed farming.  Sifton chose not to 
renew these leases as they came up for renewal, opting to open the land to homesteaders 
instead and the ranching industry was therefore in decline.23  If Alberta was established 
as a separate province, then the ranchers could expect more favourable treatment from 
their provincial government. 
While the Liberals and even some Conservatives focused their arguments on the 
political effects of partition, Haultain now focused exclusively on the ‘administrative’ 
problems that two provinces would cause.  Haultain believed that if the Territories were 
divided, it would create administrative inefficiencies and amplify the West’s financial 
difficulties.  It would also dilute the West’s influence in Parliament given the region’s 
rapid growth.  How would Territorial civil servants be divided?  If civil servants based 
in Regina would be employed by Saskatchewan, it would force Alberta to construct a 
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 civil service from scratch.24  How would Alberta deal with the burden of constructing a 
capital?  Haultain emphasized problems while Laurier spoke hopefully of the future.  
Perhaps taking a cue from Sir John A. Macdonald, a father of Confederation, Haultain 
argued that many of Canada’s problems was the result of too many provinces each 
putting local needs ahead of national ones. 
Haultain’s critique that dividing the North-West would make the region 
vulnerable to exploitation was more realistic.  As Oliver Mowatt proved during his 
tenure as Premier of Ontario, the most effective means of thwarting the will of the 
federal cabinet lay not with the ‘official’ opposition in Parliament but a determined 
provincial government.  Indeed, a friendly provincial government was often a valuable 
ally in federal election campaigns.  Dividing the prairies in two provinces divided this 
influence in two. 
Haultain may have been able to oppose Laurier if he had the support of his 
cabinet.  His premiership was notable for the influence Haultain had over his 
government.  In the Government of the North-West Territories, the premier set the most 
important policies with the advice of a few key officials.  Suddenly having to deal with 
the federal government, which was capable of operating independently of the 
government of the Northwest Territories, was unexpected.  Haultain did not believe 
anyone, not even Laurier, would seriously challenge his autonomy policy.  Haultain’s 
autonomy policy—the scholarly fruit of a man familiar with constitutional law and 
Canadian history—was good policy.  Haultain failed to convince his cabinet colleagues 
of the virtue of his position vis-à-vis Laurier’s.  These men all sided with Laurier.  
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 Haultain had depended on these men to organize his campaigns.  Denied this support, 
Haultain was left little room to manoeuvre when confronted by a federal government 
with its own policy. 
Controversy over the schools clauses prevented swift passage of the Autonomy 
Bills.  Laurier had wanted to reintroduce the Catholic and Protestant school boards that 
existed in 1875 by entrenching them in the new provincial constitution.  Clifford 
Sifton’s resignation triggered a brief crisis that ended when Laurier negotiated a 
compromise schools clause that facilitated the passage of the two bills.25  When they 
each passed the House of Commons, the deal was done.  Haultain’s virulent and 
persistent criticism of Laurier had associated him with the Conservatives in the public 
imagination.  Ironically, the Conservatives failed to recognize him as a Conservative.  
Haultain had alienated the Liberals completely without building any bridges within the 
Conservative party. 
The Saskatchewan Act received Royal Assent on 20 July 1905; it was to come 
into force on 1 September.26  The territorial Liberals immediately began organizing for 
the imminent provincial election.  George Bulyea was appointed lieutenant-governor of 
Alberta, leaving it an open question as to who would become the Liberal leader in 
Saskatchewan.  The Liberals quickly chose Liberal Member of Parliament Walter Scott 
as provincial leader.27  It turned out to be a fortuitous decision, as the next few years 
would demonstrate.  Although lacking Haultain’s debating skills and scholarly abilities, 
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 Scott proved to be talented politician.  Under Scott’s leaderships, the Liberals became 
the dominant party in Saskatchewan.  Liberal hegemony stood in stark contrast with 
Conservative disorganisation, especially since they had failed to develop much of a 
platform or even select a leader.  The Conservatives were planning to rectify these 
shortcomings by calling a convention, but this was cancelled when Haultain announced 
that he would continue as a non-partisan.  The Conservatives backed out of politics, 
unofficially at least, and Haultain was chosen leader of the newly created ‘Provincial 
Rights Party’. 
The Provincial Rights Party was a vehicle for Haultain to continue as a non-
partisan politician.  The ridiculousness of this proposition was demonstrated on 4 
September.  The vice-regal party arrived in Regina on that day to inaugurate the new 
province.  The governor-general, in the presence of the prime minister and several other 
dignitaries, was to issue the proclamation creating the Province of Saskatchewan.  After 
speeches by the governor-general and the prime minister, Saskatchewan’s first 
lieutenant-governor was sworn into office.28  Haultain was conspicuously absent from 
the proceedings.  Regina Mayor Laird claimed that Haultain had been invited to speak, 
but that he had asked to be excused.29  This was peculiar; nearly everyone else of 
significance spoke.  If Haultain did choose not to address the gathering on such an 
important day, it was testimony to the poverty of his political skills. 
Despite Haultain’s failure to participate in the inaugural ceremonies, many were 
surprised when the new lieutenant-governor asked Walter Scott to form Saskatchewan’s 
first government on 5 September.  The members of Saskatchewan’s first cabinet were 
                                                 
28 “Hail Province of Saskatchewan”, The Regina Leader, September 6, 1905, 1 & 3 
29 “Haultain not ignored”, The Regina Leader, September 13, 1905, 1. 
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 announced on 12 September.  Scott had convinced an impressive number of leading 
Territorial figures to support the Liberals and serve in the provincial government.  
William Motherwell, a former Deputy Commissioner of Agriculture, was appointed 
Agricultural Commissioner and James Alexander Calder, a political veteran of the 
Territorial period, was appointed Treasurer and Education Commissioner.  Just a year 
previously, many of these men had been staunch Haultain supporters. 
Many have argued that Haultain was entitled to the premiership of 
Saskatchewan.  Was it improper to summon Walter Scott?  It is customary in newly 
formed jurisdictions that the premier should be chosen at the will of the Crown pending 
the first general election.30  Haultain realized that the coalition that had governed the 
region had shattered.  He believed that Scott and the provincial Liberal politicians were 
puppets of Laurier, while the voters supported him.  Haultain’s assessment of Scott’s 
support was a gross misinterpretation of the political situation.  Saskatchewan accepted 
party politics and the Liberals were now going to act like a party.  With even a minority 
supporting the Liberals, non-partisanship was now practically impossible.  Still, Haultain 
persisted in his belief that non-partisanship was the ideal method to conduct politics.  
With his remaining support, he formed the first protest party in Canadian history.31
                                                 
30 The appointment of ministers is a Royal Prerogative and the idea that ministers should 
have the support of the legislature is a constitutional convention.  There is no precedent 
in Canada limiting the Crown’s option to select the first premier when a jurisdiction is 
first formed.  If the Crown appoints a premier that the Assembly cannot support, it is the 
responsibility of the Assembly to withdraw its support.  See Peter Hogg, The 
Constitution of Canada, 4th Ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1997), 258. 
31 I dispute the assertion put forth by many historians that the Patrons of Industry was 
the first protest party.  While they did seek Parliamentary seats during the 1880s, once 
elected, Patrons acted as independents rather than as a parliamentary group.  The Patrons 
of Industry was therefore an interest group. 
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 Despite being dejected and now alone, Haultain remained a force to be reckoned 
with.  The key to the Provincial Rights Party platform was the promise to contest the 
lack of provincial control over natural resources.  Even his harshest critics pointed to his 
stature.  Most historians have been quite sympathetic to Haultain personally.  Haultain 
was never accused of harbouring devious motives.  Even Laurier displayed nothing but 
respect for the Territorial premier.  Provincial Rights Party supporters hoped that 
Haultain could translate the widespread respect in which he was held into votes.  
Haultain argued that the British North-America Act of 1871 did not permit the 
modification of section 91 and 92 of the British North America Act, 1867—only to 
“erect provinces out of existing territories.”32  Therefore, the failure to give provinces 
full control over civil law was ultra virus.  This was a very desperate and silly move on 
Haultain’s part.  The British North America Act, 1871 had been enacted by the Imperial 
Parliament specifically to ensure that the Parliament of Canada had the power to create a 
Manitoba.  Whether intended or not, the British North America Act, 1870 also gave 
Parliament the authority to create provinces without control over Crown lands.  This was 
obvious to anyone with a superficial knowledge of constitutional law; it therefore should 
have been obvious to Haultain.  Haultain had always staked so much on his mastery of 
constitutional law and history.  Scott and the Liberals marvelled at their good fortune. 
In organizing the Provincial Rights Party for the election, Haultain encountered 
two problems.  The first and probably most pressing was the lack of colleagues of the 
same calibre as Scott’s front bench.  Aside from Haultain, the entire pre-autonomy 
cabinet consisted of Liberals who proved unwilling, post-autonomy, to support their 
                                                 
32 Canada, Statutes of Canada, 34 and 35 Victoria, c. 28 
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 former leader.  Haultain’s failure to find a well-known politician with government 
experience to work at his side detracted from his claim of enjoying widespread support.  
In stark contrast to Scott and his government, a Haultain cabinet would have been full of 
neophytes.  The Liberals, with the help of their counterparts in Ottawa, expended a 
tremendous amount of energy on organizing their party in the North-West.  Most 
townships had at least a few “card carrying” Liberals.  When the provincial election was 
called, it was simply a matter of getting one of them to organize for the upcoming 
battle.33
Ironically, while the Liberals successfully labelled Haultain as a Conservative, 
few Conservatives offered him any support.  No Conservative Member of Parliament or 
Senator campaigned for the Provincial Rights Party.  Although there were rumours that 
Manitoba’s governing Conservatives were assisting the Provincial Rights Party, it 
remains unproven.  Borden was conspicuously absent, while Laurier was supporting 
Scott behind the scenes.  Aside from R.B. Bennett’s periodic bursts of organizational 
energy, such as the Moose Jaw convention in 1903, there was really nobody preparing 
the Conservatives in Saskatchewan to function as a party in the heat of an election 
campaign.  Liberals, by contrast, were so organised because of the strength that the 
federal wing of the party had in the province.  When the territorial coalition 
subsequently collapsed, it turned out to be a significant boon to their fortunes. 
Haultain’s failure to acknowledge the Conservative Party was another obstacle to 
effectively opposing Scott’s government.  At a time when the dividing lines between the 
federal and provincial wings of Canadian political parties were blurred, provincial 
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(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1974), 32-34. 
 54
 politicians often depended on their federal ‘cousins’ for financial and logistical support 
during elections.  Because of his passionate pursuit of “non-partisanship,” Haultain 
failed to establish links with the Conservative Party.  It is reasonable to assume that 
Conservatives would have done what they could do to help, if only to defeat a Liberal 
government.  The Manitoba government was Conservative and Robert Rogers, the 
‘Minister of Elections’ quickly acquired a reputation for skilled political organization; 
the Conservative Senator James Lougheed, now in Alberta, was equally skilled as a 
fundraiser.  Would these not have been useful colleagues for Haultain to cultivate?  
Always a poor organizer, Haultain was now in a situation that emphasized his 
weaknesses. 
In organizing his “non-party,” Haultain did what many Western provincial 
leaders have done since his time.  He played up the ‘aggravated’ relationship that the 
Prairie Provinces had with the national government.  He suggested that a “test case” be 
placed before the courts to determine the constitutionality of The Saskatchewan Act.34  
He was not particularly convincing with this line of argument.  Westerners were too 
busy celebrating their achievement of provincehood to notice any defects in their new 
constitution.  Unfortunately, as a man who always felt most at home when dealing with 
constitutional issues and administrative problems, Haultain was out of his depth with 
political organization; he had depended on Bulyea for that.  Indeed, to this point in his 
career, Haultain had always happened into positions of authority, not by mistake, but 
with his supporters organizing his electoral machine on his behalf.  Because he was 
                                                 
34 The mind boggles at the idea of the Attorney-General of Saskatchewan appearing 
before the Supreme Court of Saskatchewan to argue that the provincial constitution was 
unconstitutional. 
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 unable to find a lieutenant within the Provincial Rights Party capable of doing this kind 
of organizational work for him, Haultain attempted to do it himself.  His party was left 
completely without a platform apart from the criticism of The Saskatchewan Act. 
In the ensuing election Haultain’s campaign focused on a negative message.  
While the Liberals spoke of hope, Haultain traveled the province describing how 
Saskatchewan had been defrauded.  Because of his negativity, Haultain found himself 
unable to identify issues that concerned the new province.  Ideally, he should have found 
something that could have distinguished him from the governing Liberals, but this would 
have been difficult due to his inability to carry the issue of a single province. 
Haultain fought Saskatchewan’s first provincial election as best he could.  
Attracting skilled political lieutenants proved impossible.  There was no real platform to 
draw the principled support of potential candidates.  Haultain, not even in a position to 
offer the limited connections of the Conservative Party, only attracted ambitious locals, 
mostly political neophytes, to contest the election.  The reaction to Haultain’s suggestion 
of test case specifically, was swift.  Conservative papers were in agreement with 
Haultain’s position on the unconstitutionality of the Saskatchewan Act.  Haultain had 
come to be identified with the Conservative Party, something that the Liberals 
encouraged.  His association with the Conservative Party largely negated his claim to 
non-partisanship. 
Haultain should have accepted the leadership of a Conservative Party, accepting 
with grace the derision that such a flip-flop would cause.  With the organizational and 
financial aid of the Conservatives, Haultain may have stood a chance at winning the 
election.  As it was, the election was essentially over before the campaigning began.  
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 Haultain’s negative-one-issue campaign proved ineffective against the Liberals, who 
spoke of the birth of a golden age. After all, few were willing to consider the possibility 
that the autonomy acts had been passed with undue haste.  Despite the Liberal 
gerrymandering, Haultain put up a fairly good fight.  The twenty-five seats in the first 
legislative assembly were very hotly contested.  Still, when the ballots were counted, 
there were seventeen Liberals to eight Provincial Rights supporters. 
Losing the first election was a devastating blow to Haultain’s future political 
chances.  Even the illusion of non-partisanship was destroyed when Haultain accepted 
the leadership of His Majesty’s Loyal Opposition in the new legislature, an office which 
did not exist in the Territorial Assembly.  Without a cabinet position, Haultain had no 
outlet for his administrative skills.  Within the assembly, Haultain focused on being a 








Wandering in the Wilderness 
 
The Provincial Rights Party met in Moose Jaw in January 1906 to plan strategy 
for the first session of the new Legislature.  Despite his recent setback, Frederick W.G. 
Haultain had every reason to be confident that he would soon return to power.  The 
Provincial Rights Party under Haultain’s leadership had lost the election by less than one 
percent of the popular vote, and Haultain was still the most respected politician in 
Saskatchewan.1  Still, Liberal Premier Walter Scott recognized that the fortunes of a 
political party in Saskatchewan would rise and fall with the success or failure of the 
farmer.  That important lesson was strangely lost on the former territorial premier.  The 
Scott government pursued a series of policies intended to make rural life more 
conformable and agriculture less financially precarious.  Haultain, by contrast, chose his 
platform poorly, constantly misreading public option.  His idea to press for a judicial 
review to test the constitutionality of The Saskatchewan Act may have been justified 
from his perspective, but it dumbfounded many voters.  The party was further hurt by 
Haultain's failure to make significant inroads among the many newcomers, especially 
German immigrants.  Scott was looking to the future; Haultain had his eyes fixed firmly 
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 on past grievances.  Frederick Haultain was a skilled administrator and jurist but, 
deprived of office after 1905, he proved to be an incompetent politician. 
Early in the afternoon on 29 March 1906, Lieutenant-Governor Amédée Forget 
left Government House to open the first session of the first legislature of the new 
province.  He was escorted by a small dispatch of Royal North-West Mounted Police 
officers.2  William Motherwell, the provincial secretary, greeted him at the door of the 
old Territorial Legislature.  The membership of the new assembly was a snapshot of the 
changing provincial demographics.  There were farmers and a few professionals; many 
were recent arrivals from the United Kingdom, Ontario and the American Midwest.  
Interspersed with these homesteaders was a francophone.  It was an inexperienced lot; 
the twenty-five members of the new provincial legislature contained only had a handful 
of Territorial veterans.  Indeed, the most compelling argument for electing Thomas 
MacNutt Speaker was that he was the only Liberal member of the Legislative Assembly 
of the North-West Territories, whose rules would govern proceedings until new ones 
were drawn up.3
Parliamentary inexperience was not limited to one caucus, or for that matter, to 
the backbench.  Listening to the lieutenant-governor reading the Speech from the 
Throne, the four commissioners were ridiculously inexperienced considering the job 
they were about to undertake.  None had held Territorial office and only Premier Walter 
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 Scott had served in a parliamentary body.4  The government backbenchers were even 
more inexperienced and the opposition was in a similar predicament.  By 1905, all of 
Haultain’s colleagues in the Territorial government had been Liberals.  None of these 
men were present in the new Legislature nor did they support the Provincial Rights 
Party.  The members of the Provincial Rights Party caucus were equally 
inexperienced—only Haultain, A.B Gillis, and Dr W. Elliot had served in the Territorial 
Assembly.5  The Provincial Rights side had the majority of the professionals and drew 
considerable support from urban areas and from the ranching community.  However, 
support from these two important groups was no match for the Liberals' support in the 
rural, agricultural areas.  Voters residing in rural ridings comprised the bulk of the 
population of the new province and during Saskatchewan’s first decade, the number of 
rural ridings would only grow.  If Haultain wished to form a government, he would have 
to find a way to build support in rural communities.  
The first session of the first legislature was both busy and crucial to the 
development of the province and the Liberal party.  With the possible exception of the 
first session of the tenth legislature in 1944, convened to enact the bulk of the newly 
elected Cooperative Commonwealth Federation’s party agenda, never again would a 
legislature enact such a variety of key legislation.6  The legislature would be asked to 
approve “measures relating to the Lieutenant-Governor, the Executive Council, the 
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 Legislative Assembly and the several departments of the public service.”7  The 
Saskatchewan Act described the new government in broad terms; it was up to the first 
Legislature to create the court and executive departments.  These reforms were 
undertaken in part to undermine Haultain’s position by distancing the new provincial 
government from its territorial predecessor.  The Saskatchewan Act provided that all 
ordinances in effect in the Territories that were not inconsistent with the act would 
continue until repealed.8  Scott was therefore recreating the entire administrative arm of 
government, a system that Haultain had taken great pride in designing.  Indeed, the only 
major departure from the system Haultain created was the establishment of a 
Department of Railways.  Haultain did not see this as an opportunity to attack the 
government. 
Haultain began the new session confident in his position.  He sincerely believed 
that he had been cheated out of office in the election of 1905.  He concluded that Scott 
had won the election by relying on the intervention of federal officials in key ridings and 
through the government’s use of patronage.  Walter Scott’s biographer, Gordon 
Barnhart, has suggested that Scott did not use patronage to build support during the four 
months between his swearing in and the election.  Scott simply did not have time to 
“reshape the government”.9  However, Territorial Conservatives had been complaining 
since 1903 that the territorial cabinet, dominated as it was by “federal Liberals,” was 
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8 The Saskatchewan Act. 
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 using the public works commissionership to build support for the Liberal party.10  The 
synchronized patronage of the federal and provincial government was brought to bear 
against the Provincial Rights Party.   Given that Haultain was in power while the Liberal 
machine was being built and that he conceivably approved many of the appointments, he 
only had himself to blame. 
Despite the partisan nature of the session, the members got along well together.  
The small community of Regina and the short duration of the sessions ensured that the 
members socialized together during parties at the Royal North-West Mounted Police 
barracks and state functions at Government House.  The members' differences were 
often quite limited.  The second day of the session saw the appointment of committees.  
Haultain’s reputation as a solicitor was recognized by his appointment to the law reform 
committee.11
Haultain began the session by repeating the arguments he made during the 
general election campaign.  In replying to the Speech from the Throne, Haultain 
recognized the problem that he was facing.  The session would be the first real test of the 
Scott government and his claim to the premiership.  The Scott government’s support in 
the provincial election was widespread but not deep.  Many ridings had been won by 
small margins.12  Haultain assumed that most of the issues from the election were still in 
play and that Scott’s hold on power was tenuous.  Haultain still commanded a large 
section of the electorate’s support.  Many editorials during and immediately after the 
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 election had lamented Scott’s ascendancy; it was not uncommon to declare Frederick 
Haultain the “First Statesman of the Canadian North-West.”13  Walter Scott was one of 
the first to recognize the challenge he faced in measuring up to Haultain. 
Haultain attempted to reassert himself in the uncomfortable role of Leader of the 
Opposition by repeating his platform from the provincial election campaign.  He seems 
to have believed that it was possible to convince enough Liberals to vote against the 
government to cause its defeat.  It is clear from his actions during the first session that he 
believed that the unity of the government caucus was tenuous—an explosive issue could 
easily divide the Liberal party.  He opened with what should have been his most 
effective argument, a critique of The Saskatchewan Act.  In the debate on the address in 
reply to the Speech from the Throne, Haultain immediately denounced many of the 
clauses of the Saskatchewan Act.  His first target was the schools settlement.14  The 
settlement was anathema to Haultain’s educational policy, a policy that stressed the 
assimilation of all territorial inhabitants to the British-Canadian ‘norm’ of the political 
and economic elite.  He again brought up the pastoral letter from Archbishop Langevin, 
declaring that Catholics should support the Liberals in the December 1905 provincial 
election.  He reaffirmed his commitment to National Schools “and the fight against the 
hierarchical domination of the west by Quebec directed through the priest ridden 
                                                 
13 Grant MacEwan, Frederick Haultain: Frontier Statesman of the Canadian North-West 
(Saskatoon: Western Producer Prairie Books, 1985), vii-viii. 
14 The settlement declared that the Province would have to make certain guarantees, in 
perpetuity, to the Roman Catholics of the Territories to support separate schools for their 
benefit.  In 1905, this was tantamount to entrenching the right of francophones to 
maintain, at least in within their community, their language and culture.   
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 government in Ottawa.”15  Haultain was reaffirming the stance his party had made 
during their August convention.  Schools should be agents of cultural assimilation in 
addition to teaching the technical skills needed in an agricultural province. 
The schools question itself had been very divisive, but the divisions were 
between provinces, between Ontarians and other anglo-Protestants and francophone 
Quebecers.  The people of Saskatchewan were united in their feelings.  Haultain was 
dredging up an issue settled largely in Saskatchewan’s interest.  The curriculum taught 
in the Catholic schools would be set in Regina, not Rome.16   What is interesting about 
this speech is it would set the pattern for the Provincial Rights Party within the 
Legislature.  In speaking on the address in reply, the members of the Opposition largely 
failed to pick up on points initiated by Haultain.  They either did not participate in the 
debate or they proceeded to discuss issues that they considered to be of strictly local 
concern.  The issue of education in the first session died with the conclusion of 
Haultain’s speech. 
Besides the education critique, the remainder of Haultain’s speech was only 
vaguely critical of the government’s priorities.  The government’s agenda was a 
scattershot mix of questionable administrative reforms. Haultain did have enough 
foresight to see that the CPR tax exemptions would potentially create a huge revenue 
problem for the region.  Forcing the government to discuss the CPR tax exemption could 
highlight a weakness in their policy, but he diluted a powerful critique with questions 
about trivial matters.  At one point Haultain asked why, “the attorney-general [had] 
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 nothing better to do than make arrangements for coroners.”17  Still, the CPR tax 
exception was an opportunity Haultain did not totally miss. 
Haultain asserted that denying the province the ability to tax the property that 
was owned by the largest private landholder in Saskatchewan unbalanced Confederation.  
Haultain asserted that the CPR tax exception shifted the burden of provincial taxation to 
the prairie farmer.  If Confederation was an equal partnership between the provinces, 
there were now two provinces lacking a right enjoyed by the original four--management 
of the public domain.  He declared that, in response to The Saskatchewan Act, “our 
hopes were realized to a certain extent, but to say that they were amply realized is to say 
something, which to say the least, cannot be borne out by facts … I do not know whether 
the fathers of Confederation would recognize this new constitution or whether they 
would like it.  It is a gross libel on the memory of the great men of Canada.”18  Haultain 
clearly believed that the novelty of Saskatchewan’s constitution could upset the balance 
of power in Canada.  What is unclear is whether he was aware that the tide of public 
opinion was quickly shifting to Walter Scott’s position that the present settlement was 
sufficient. 
As the debate on the address in reply to the Throne Speech drew to a close, A.B. 
Gillis, the Provincial Rights MLA for Whitewood, moved an amendment to the address.  
While the Provincial Rights Party would join in congratulating the creation of 
Saskatchewan, the assembly should “most respectfully express our regret that in their 
establishment that important principle of absolute equality among the provinces of the 
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 Dominion which is the only sure guarantee of the permanency of the confederation 
structure, has not been adhered to in several important respects.”  That so much energy 
was invested in amending the address in reply to the speech from the throne speaks to 
the belief among Haultain and his supporters that partisanship had not totally 
overwhelmed the legislature; that a persuasive argument could carry an amendment to a 
government bill.  Alas, the first division in Saskatchewan’s legislative history had the 
Legislature dividing on strictly party lines, 7 to 13.19  Nobody in the press gallery or 
even the opposition remarked at the incredible occurrence, but the old Territorial 
Legislative building had just seen its first formal whiff of partisanship that, in 1904, 
seemed unimaginable.  Anyone from that time would have been dumbfounded by the 
sight of Haultain being on the outside looking in—and doing it so poorly. 
The first division along party lines triggered a debate in the assembly a few days 
later, ostensibly about the schools question.  The progress of this debate clearly 
demonstrates how non-partisanship had collapsed.  If Haultain realized this, he did not 
adjust his actions in response.  Dr. Ellis, one of Haultain’s most influential and 
outspoken lieutenants, declared that the former Territorial premier had been victimized 
by the “Ottawa dictators” when it became clear to them that Haultain would not support 
their Autonomy policy in 1905.  In what would become habit for the Provincial Rights 
caucus, the government was accused of being the clandestine cover for direct rule from 
Ottawa.  Dr. Ellis declared, “Mr. Haultain was turned down because he said he would 
exercise all the rights of British freemen in fighting the autonomy bill, and would find 
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 out just where the constitutional rights were.”20  A few other members added fury to the 
fire by suggesting that Haultain had been turned out because he had campaigned for 
Conservative candidates in two federal by-elections in Ontario.21  The crescendo of this 
fury—the opposition had by this point captured the momentum of the debate—came 
with Liberal William Charles Sutherland’s introduction of a motion to have The 
Saskatchewan Act placed before the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council.22
Adding to the drama was Haultain’s almost winning a vote that fixed the amount 
of sessional indemnity for the members.  The question was how much should the MLAs 
receive in recognition of their services, $700 or $1000.  Many members pointed out the 
trouble of travelling to Regina and the expense of their extended residence in the 
provincial capital as warranting a significant increase over the Territorial indemnity.  
Haultain agreed that a raise was in order but believed that $700 was sufficient.  
Everyone was stunned when Haultain lost the motion by a single vote. 
While the near loss of the indemnity motion may not have been a clear indicator 
of the state of the government’s support, it did temporarily knock the cabinet off keel. 
Scott quickly gained his footing again.  Whatever Scott may have felt regarding his 
ability compared to Haultain, he was clearly capable of opposing him.  The newspapers 
on 6 April reported his response in the assembly to Haultain’s accusations regarding the 
constitutionality of The Saskatchewan Act.  Scott asserted that the government believed 
that the constitutional problems had been solved by the British North America Act of 
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 1870, which had been designed to remove doubts about the constitutionality of The 
Manitoba Act.  Scott then went on to explain why Haultain had been passed over for the 
premiership when the new government had been formed.  He simply did not support the 
constitution of Saskatchewan.  It would have been unthinkable to place a person in 
charge of implementing a constitutional settlement to which he was diametrically 
opposed. 
Scott’s answer was somewhat melodramatic but basically sound.  He was quite 
correct in stating that none of the original provincial premiers had ever worked to 
undermine the constitutional settlement that was being implemented.  Indeed, when 
choosing the governments in the new provinces of Quebec and Ontario, then Prime 
Minister Sir John A. Macdonald chose politicians from the ranks of his own Liberal-
Conservative Party to form the first governments.23  While it is questionable whether 
Haultain could have single-handedly reversed the settlement, he could have undoubtedly 
created a headache for Laurier.  The matter had been settled to the satisfaction of both 
Parliament and the majority of the people of Saskatchewan.  It had been a close election, 
but most people considered the issue settled.  Nothing was to be gained by Haultain’s 
insistence on his right of ascendancy. 
The debate came to a climax when James Thomas Brown of the opposition came 
forward with another argument supporting Haultain’s aspirations to the premiership.  
Brown argued that Haultain should have been provided with the opportunity to 
demonstrate that he was unsuited to the task of governing and that he should have been 
given the premiership of the Province, and the people should have had the option to 
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 thrown him out.  “He had come out with a straight platform and on it he was prepared to 
stand or fall, but His Honour had seen fit to call another to usurp the position the leader 
of the opposition should have held.”24
Scott realized that the debate had the potential to grow beyond the confines of 
the Assembly, perhaps endangering his government.  The government placed a motion 
before the Assembly requesting “that the Saskatchewan Act be placed before the Privy 
Council for Judicial review of their constitutionally.”25  The motion was a sly move by 
Scott.  He knew that Laurier would be completely unwilling to do anything to jeopardize 
the status quo.  Placing a ‘hot’ issue before the federal government was a clever move—
one that would be repeated by future western premiers.  Ironically, he probably learned 
it from Haultain’s example of dealing with federal authorities.  Scott shifted the blame to 
the federal government, planning to plead provincial impotence if the issue was again 
raised in the Assembly. 
Haultain believed that the motion had been introduced for partisan purposes to 
undermine his position in the Assembly.26  Some newspapers sardonically wondered if 
Scott would be dismissed for casting doubt on the legality of the provincial 
constitution.27  After all, was it not this sort of behaviour that got Haultain dismissed in 
the first place?  Scott understood in arranging for Sutherland to introduce the motion that 
Laurier would not act.  He was shrewdly undermining Haultain’s position while risking 
nothing more than a little heckling from the editorialists in the press gallery.  Haultain 
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 tried to regain the upper hand by introducing an amendment to the test-case motion 
claiming that, as there was “a difference of opinion respecting the constitutionality of 
certain provisions of The Saskatchewan Act … it is desirable that all doubt should be 
removed.”28  The Haultain amendment was defeated on a strictly party lines vote.  The 
more partisan Scott motion was carried, so the matter was dropped.  Laurier, as 
expected, never acknowledged the motion and the issue quickly receded from the public 
imagination. 
The first session was prorogued on 26 May 1906.29  The Assembly went into a 
ten-month interregnum as the cabinet set up the departments and prepared for the next 
sitting.  The budget had been the last item of the session.  Haultain offered some token 
resistance, but the government’s legislative program had passed with little difficulty.  
The provincial administrative machinery was now in place and with the eyes of the 
whole province focused optimistically on the future; the achievements of the Territorial 
period were quickly fading from memory. 
Such a long recess was not uncommon for a provincial legislature of the time.  
The Assembly’s business was normally limited to less than ten public bills and a few 
private incorporations.  Canadians were willing to allow the cabinet to go about the day-
to-day affairs of state with little scrutiny.  Haultain, like all opposition leaders, had 
limited opportunity to engage in public debate.  Not surprisingly, he receded into the 
background, probably concerning himself with his rapidly growing legal practice.  He 
would have been unaccustomed to being so far removed from the spotlight.  In the 
                                                 
28 Journals of the Legislative Assembly of Saskatchewan, 1906, (may 22, 1906) 
29 SAB, “Sessions of the Legislative Assembly and their Duration”, Saskatchewan 
Executive and Legislative Directory, section 2-12, 1. 
70 
 territorial period, newspapermen sought out his opinion on a variety of matters.  Now, 
the reporters who had been friendliest to Haultain were in Alberta concerning 
themselves with the affairs of another province.  It was even less helpful that he was so 
unaccustomed to manufacturing his own publicity.  His lack of interest in publicizing 
himself did not help him build any support. 
Haultain always seemed to save his most remarkable speeches for those in 
support of the government.  When the Saskatchewan Legislature returned on February 
28, 1907 Haultain was in a weakened state.  His platform had been seriously undermined 
but nobody, including the government, thought that the wounds were fatal.  The first 
matter before the legislature was the establishment of a new court system.  Haultain 
would be playing to his strength.  Saskatchewan and Alberta were still using the judicial 
system designed for the old North-West Territories.  The Supreme Court bill before the 
legislature would abolish the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the North-West 
Territories in Saskatchewan.  It would be replaced with a system of circuit courts and an 
appellate court to deal with both civil and criminal matters.  The government may not 
have organized a judicial system during the first session of the legislature fearing that it 
may provide Haultain with an opportunity to bring down the government.  Haultain was 
regarded as an expert on jurisprudence.  He had been one of the leading solicitors in 
western Canada for over a decade and the attorney-general of the North-West Territories 
for the last seven years.  Haultain welcomed the introduction of the court legislation and, 
in what would become a habit of his time leading the opposition, made some ‘helpful’ 
suggestions.  He asked if it would not be better to pattern the new court system after the 
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 reforms underway in England for the court system of England and Wales.30  Although he 
never expanded upon the details of that plan, it probably involved placing all the judicial 
functions of the province in a single court based out of Regina and Saskatoon, which 
sent judges out on yearly circuits to hold court on a number of minor cases. 
The second matter before the legislature was education.  Education had always 
been a special concern to Haultain.  During the territorial period, he had gone to great 
lengths to ensure that he secured the best people to write the provincial curriculum and 
administer the department.  To Haultain, education was not simply a means of economic 
progress but a means of social stability.31  Calder seemed to share many of Haultain’s 
ideas and had continued the educational politics of the territorial period.  Indeed, one of 
the first acts in the area of education established the University of Saskatchewan.  The 
territorial University Haultain had envisioned became the model for the new University.  
The University Convocation would elect the majority of the members to the Board of 
Governors, ensuring a nondenominational institution free from government influence. 32  
Haultain was obviously still closely associated with the idea of a provincial university.  
He was elected by the convocation to be a member of the first University Senate shortly 
after its creation.33
The second session wound down with the presentation of the provincial budget.  
Here too, Haultain found that he was limited to criticizing the details of a policy with 
which he found himself in broad agreement.  He proposed that the government was not 
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 being as careful with accounting principles as he would have been, but concluded it was 
an acceptable budget.  His most damming criticism was that the government had no 
“fixed and guiding principle” in their estimates.34  Haultain gave the opposition’s final 
speech of the session.  He again failed to make a compelling case for why he should lead 
the opposition, never mind the government.  The Morning Leader, a Liberal paper, 
summed up his performance by reporting that the leader of the opposition had indulged 
in his well-known “penchant for sarcasm and his many remarks of this nature were 
thoroughly enjoyed by the house, and apparently quite as much by the members 
occupying the government benches as his own followers.”35
The Provincial Rights Party was formed primarily to oppose the autonomy 
settlement and therefore the Liberal Party but Haultain alienated members of his own 
caucus by failing to be the voice of those opposed to Scott’s government.  The new 
provincial University was a case in point.  Calder modelled his university bill very 
closely on a similar Territorial ordinance.  Indeed, Haultain stated that if the bill found 
disapproval in Ottawa and was disallowed by the Governor-in-Council “the opposition 
would be a unit in support of the government.”36  Supporting a threatened government 
was not wise for an opposition leader who wished to become premier.  Besides, would 
supporting the government in a dispute over jurisdiction with the federal government not 
contradict the Provincial Right Party’s platform on the validity of The Saskatchewan 
Act? The second session ended with Haultain having accomplished nothing but 
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 alienating some of his own supporters.  The Cabinet was likely shocked that Haultain, 
who had been such a bitter foe the previous session, was so willing to cooperate in 
passing so much key legislation.  His own tactics probably did not endear him to his own 
backbenchers.  The backbenchers were quickly drifting from Haultain’s leadership. 
As the provincial Legislature went into the intra-session deepfreeze, Haultain 
again found himself with no political outlet.  Should he not have been travelling the 
province giving speeches?  Could he not have spent some time creating a policy to 
pursue?  By now, it may not have mattered.  Haultain liked to feel he was making a 
contribution to anything with which he was involved.  He undoubtedly would have 
thrown himself into his duties as a University senator with his usual gusto.  The 
university would have been making arrangements to put down permanent roots in a 
Saskatoon.37  These limited victories did not prepare him for the trouble he was about to 
face. 
The last session of the first legislature opened to great fanfare on 2 April 1908.38  
The Speech from the Throne was full of optimistic pronouncements about the future of 
agriculture within the province.39  Haultain was not suspicious that an election would 
soon be called.  He should have been.  The province’s institutions were now almost 
complete.  The provincial legislature was under construction and the court system was 
functioning. The province was quickly filling with homesteaders and there was fear that, 
with all the rapid changes taking place, the legislature was no longer as reflective of the 
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 electorate as it should be.  Soon after Scott introduced the Oaths bill, there was 
speculation about when the next election would take place.40  Would the proposed 
redistribution of seats precede an early election? 
Haultain seemed to becoming accustomed to life on the opposition benches.  He 
was slowly growing more concerned with the needs of agriculture.  His first speech 
demanded that the government do something about the horrible state of grain 
transportation system.  Manitoba and Alberta were each exploring the option of 
provincial ownership and control of elevators, but Scott was hesitant.  The other 
important issue to Haultain was the creation of a telephone system for the province.  
Long distance telephone service would help the isolated homesteader keep in touch with 
the wider world, but the sparsely populated province made it impossible to make a 
reliable system profitable.  Bell Telephone’s presence in the province was therefore 
small and mostly confined to urban areas.  In dealing with these issues during the next 
few years, Scott would lay the foundation for a generation of Liberal dominance; 
Haultain would almost destroy his party. 
Haultain began the third session in fine form.  He opened by declaring that the 
contract negotiated by Education Minister Calder that had Morag Ltd. of the United 
States print school textbooks was an example of government profiteering.  The 
government wanted to provide free textbooks to each school district in an attempt to 
harmonize the provincial curriculum.  Haultain claimed that the benefit to the individual 
student was grossly out of proportion to the aggregate cost.41  The textbook provision 
would entail a large expenditure of money “with a very small benefit to the 
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 individual.”42  He went on to accuse Calder of graft.  Failing to provide evidence of this 
charge, Haultain eventually apologized to the House stating, “I never made a charge that 
I cannot prove and I admit that I cannot prove it.”43  Calder replied by giving a clause-
by-clause explanation of the contract, explaining why it was in the interests of 
Saskatchewan.  It is interesting that the government felt it necessary to prove itself 
innocent after the leader of the opposition withdrew a charge.  Haultain was still a 
political force, at least in the government’s eyes.  Calder seemed almost frightened of 
him. 
On 7 April, the Morning Leader published an article predicting a large provincial 
deficit in the next fiscal year.  Haultain declared that this deficit could only be due to the 
CPR’s exemption from property taxation.  Instead of denying the charge, the cabinet 
indicated that they were interested in testing the constitutionality of this provision in the 
courts.44  The decision to request a court’s opinion was the first sign that the government 
believed Haultain's assessment of The Saskatchewan Act had been correct.  Haultain, for 
some reason, did not take advantage of this excellent opportunity to push the Provincial 
Rights Party’s central policy: provincial control of Crown lands.  Scott had just admitted 
that the settlement was inadequate.  Why else was he running a deficit? 
Shortly after the announcement of the deficit, Calder presented the provincial 
budget which predicted a surplus.  The budget included a provision to tax the CPR.  
Haultain warned that any attempt to tax the CPR would trigger an action where the 
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 courts would be asked to rule on the constitutionality of a section of The Saskatchewan 
Act.45  Not only had his test case finally arrived, it was being initiated by the 
government.  Haultain moved to have the lieutenant-governor provide the Assembly 
with all information related to The Saskatchewan Act.  Haultain’s motion suggests that 
he suspected that something was going on behind the scenes.  It is unlikely that the CPR 
would give up the lucrative tax exception The Saskatchewan Act provided.  Scott would 
soon have to solve the revenue problem, lest Haultain’s critiques of autonomy be 
vindicated.  Perhaps Haultain had been right all along. 
When the budget was finally presented, Haultain repeated another of his habits.  
He rejected the assertion that the provincial books showed a surplus.  He believed that 
the surplus had been manufactured by including a significant bond issue as income.  
Haultain complained that “he never could quite make out what he [Scott] meant by that 
statement but he had a habit of using words in a meaning opposite to their ordinary 
sense.”46  He should have demanded an explanation for the CPR tax.  His party had been 
formed specifically to reject the autonomy settlement.  At a time when the Liberals were 
beginning to adopt Haultain’s policy, he should have been continuously pointing out that 
the financial provisions of the autonomy settlement were woefully inadequate.  The 
Liberals should not have been able to take a major plank from Haultain’s platform 
without losing credit for their own mistaken stance. 
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 Why was Haultain unable to discredit the Scott government for adopting one of 
the Provincial Rights Party’s key policies?  Haultain had cast himself in the role of a 
helpful fixer, not as a premier in waiting.  It also did not help his case that the 
backbenchers of his own party did not always follow his lead.  They generally offered 
little support to their leader.  The party itself was unorganized, the Provincial Rights 
Party caucus usually making little effort to follow up on Haultain’s critiques.  What is 
clear is that his objections had little effect on the organization of the party or its political 
agenda.  He spent the remainder of the session offering scattershot critiques of the 
government.  He found himself revisiting issues brought up earlier in the session as the 
bills came up in their final stages in the assembly. 
Just when he should have made his biggest impact, he was nitpicking.  In 
debating the final draft of a new Legislative Assembly Act, Haultain denounced the 
proposed five-year life for the legislature.  The proposed bill would extend the life of an 
assembly to a maximum of five years.  Haultain argued, “four years was considered long 
enough in most provinces.”47  In the matter of the rural telephone system, Haultain 
indicated that he saw no reason for the telephones to be operated by a cooperative; more 
to the point, he felt that the failure of the government to significantly subsidize long 
distance construction, particularly through the addition of lines through government 
ownership, would create nothing but hardship for the ratepayers.  There was concern 
about the state of the Territorial transportation system, particularly regarding the 
feasibility of a line to Hudson Bay.48  A rail link to Hudson Bay would theoretically 
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 allow grain easier access to the world’s markets by allowing them simpler access to the 
port. 
The Legislature was prorogued on 12 June 1908.  Haultain and his supporters 
were confident that another session would occur before the Legislature was dissolved.  
Scott had promised as much during the debate on the Legislative Assembly Act.  They 
were already, like the Liberals, organizing for a general election but it was a slow and 
haphazard affair testifying to their belief that they had another year.  Towards the end of 
summer, in response to new legislation giving the government permission to begin 
construction on some badly needed branch lines, Scott travelled to Ottawa to ask the 
federal government for financial assistance to that end.  With federal guarantees in hand, 
Scott arranged for the dissolution of the Legislative Assembly.49  An election was called 
for 14 August. 
Haultain was caught completely off guard.  His surprise demonstrated the 
weakness of his political skills.  The government had spent the preceding months 
enumerating electors; the legislature redistributed the electoral ridings during the last 
session.  Conservative newspapers were outraged that a “snap” election had been 
called.50  Still, Haultain quickly rallied the Provincial Rights Party.  Candidates were 
soon selected for all ridings.  The snap election call was not necessarily fatal. 
The issues of 1905 were not dead.  The Autonomy settlement had affected many 
of the decisions that the government had made since the creation of Saskatchewan.  
Haultain campaigned hard against the hated Supplementary Revenue Act, which had the 
province resorting to direct taxation to pay for education.  The province had to levy a 
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 direct tax to pay for education; it needed federal assistance to construct railway branch 
lines; it had to issue bonds to help pay for infrastructure because the province had been 
denied the resources of Crown lands.  Scott was infuriated by Haultain’s attacks but he 
found the deficit increasingly difficult to justify.  Haultain asserted that if the CPR were 
compelled to pay tax on its land, there would likely be no deficit.  Given the amount of 
land the CPR owned, this was not unreasonable.  
Despite the short notice, Haultain found no difficulty in attracting candidates in 
all ridings.  Haultain’s claim that the Provincial Rights Party was an extension of the 
non-partisan movement was seriously crippled when J.T. Brown, a federal Liberal who 
sat as a member of the Provincial Rights Party caucus, decided to seek a House of 
Commons seat as a Liberal.51  It threatened the Provincial Rights' claim to be a non-
partisan movement since the party was now made up entirely of Conservatives.  The 
Liberal newspapers of the province had a field day with the news.  For the remainder of 
his political career, the Liberal Morning Leader would refer to Haultain and his 
colleagues not as ‘Provincial Righter’ but ‘Conservatives’ in all their stories, including 
their transcriptions of Assembly debates. 
The Liberals stressed the achievements of their first term during the election 
campaign.  The railway and telephone legislation were touted as examples of the 
businesslike attitude of the province’s administration.  Haultain stressed that the 
government would find its railway policy difficult to carry out because of the inadequate 
financial terms accepted in 1905.52  He counter proposed that the branch lines should be 
built as the resources of the province would permit.  He was also highly critical of the 
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 supplementary revenue measures that placed the burden of school taxation on the 
homesteader and rancher while the wealthiest parts of the province were exempt.  On 
this issue, the Liberals were weak; the new taxes had not worked out as well as had been 
planned. 
The election results were extremely close.  Although the Liberals eventually won 
twenty-seven seats to the Provincial Rights' sixteen, it was much closer.  The Liberals 
won only 50.5 percent of the popular vote.  In eleven ridings, the Liberal candidate was 
elected with less than 100 votes.53  Cabinet ministers Motherwell and Calder failed to 
win their seats, demonstrating that Haultain’s charges of maladministration carried some 
weight.  Scott seemed to accept the results of the general election that he should forge 
ahead in the same path.  In the throne speech, the lieutenant-governor stated that “the 
foundations of important institutions were well begun by the first legislature.”  He 
complimented the members for the important work they had done in building upon those 
foundations.  Of particular interest to Haultain were the grain elevator question and the 
organization of rural municipalities. 
Haultain was not discouraged by the election results.  Indeed, as time wore on, he 
believed that he had found a reason for the assembly’s premature dissolution.  The 
province’s books were not in wonderful condition.  In addition to the province’s 
dependency on direct taxation, there was going to be a huge bond issue and the cabinet 
had greatly exceeded the 1908 estimates, forcing the Treasury to rely heavily on royal 
warrants.  According to The Standard, “the government feared to spring the two million 
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 dollar loan upon the people before first stealing from the people a five year term in 
office.”54
Despite his recent setbacks, MLA Haultain seemed to be growing in influence in 
the new legislature.  He was appointed to the Public Bills and Railway, Public Accounts 
and Printing, Law Amendments and Education committees.  On each committee, he was 
treated with a greater amount of deference than membership in the opposition usually 
entailed.  On matters of justice, he was considered something of an expert—so much so 
that the attorney-general found himself having to refute Haultain’s arguments on a case-
by-case basis. 
Early in the session, the issue of Haultain’s accusations against Calder was raised 
once again.  Scott was furious, probably because Calder had lost his seat as a result.  
Haultain had taken pride in his belief that his actions had been at least partially 
responsible for the education minister's defeat.  Scott defended Calder vigorously. 55  
Scott was clearly agitated, perhaps feeling that his government was vulnerable over this 
issue.  He accused Haultain of dishonourable conduct by accusing Calder of 
profiteering.  Haultain explained that while he was mistaken regarding Calder’s personal 
involvement, he believed that graft was involved.  Because he had no evidence, these 
were highly politicized charges—charges that Haultain found difficult to prove.  
Haultain went on to argue that he “said there was graft, and there was graft, but I did not 
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 say that the commissioner had grafted by putting money into his own pocket, but by 
violating a public trust.”56
Scott arranged for a select committee of the Assembly to investigate the charges. 
During the debate on this motion, Gillis of the opposition suggested that a Royal 
Commission should conduct the investigation instead of a partisan committee of the 
assembly.  Scott, sensing an opportunity to discredit the Provincial Rights Party, agreed.  
The announcement of the Royal Commission’s appointment caused a sensation.  Chief 
Justice E.L. Wetmore was appointed along with another Justice of the Supreme Court of 
Saskatchewan.  The commissioners conducted a brief investigation and found that the 
contract was sound. 
The commission’s report did not slow Haultain’s critiques of the government.  
The railway policy was, Haultain suggested, “a paper and pencil policy … which 
appealed to certain communities with much the same effect as would a cry of ‘bread’ 
shouted through a keyhole to a roomful of starving people.”57  Haultain pointed out that 
the railway bill had not been printed; preventing the electors from reviewing the matter 
the election had been called to resolve.58  In response to heckling, Haultain pointed out 
that his party had not done so badly under the circumstances.  They had managed to 
defeat two ministers and forced Scott to change ridings for fear that the same would 
happen to him.  Indeed, the expense of constructing so many railway lines was 
beginning to cause serious problems for the province.  By the time the budget was 
brought down in the Assembly, the Finance Minister was predicting a shortage of nearly 
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 a half a million dollars.  Haultain spent much of the budget debate pointing out that 
autonomy was supposed to solve the North-West’s financial problems.  
Haultain, in replying to the Throne Speech, outlined his theory behind the role of 
the leadership of the opposition.  He declared that the job was to find fault with the 
government’s policy, but not constantly.  The opposition leader was at least as 
responsible for limiting the partisan rancour within the Assembly as the members of the 
cabinet.  A failure to act in any other way would make the legislature too pessimistic.  
He went on to claim that he objected to being misquoted on the railway bill.59  He 
argued that “we are just as strongly in favour of the immediate construction of the 
Hudson Bay Railway” as the members of the government.60  But as leader of the 
opposition, was he not supposed to present an alternate vision for the provincial 
government?  Because he saw himself as a ‘helpful fixer’ to the government, he 
constantly missed opportunities that he should have vigorously pursued. 
With the opening of the third session of the second legislature, it was clear that 
the Provincial Rights Party was collapsing.  Haultain was unable to take advantage of 
the government’s weakness.  Haultain, in the “reply” debate, spoke for only ten minutes, 
saying vaguely that he would introduce a “controversial” matter later in the session.61  
He again returned to the central theme of the movement.  He demanded again that the 
federal Crown resources be transferred to the province so they could be used to pay for 
the school system.  It was announced during the third session that the province would 
henceforth be charged for the services of the Royal North-West Mounted Police.  The 
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 autonomy settlement Scott so often boasted about had Parliament paying the cost of the 
Mounties.   
As the evidence against autonomy was piling up, Scott was becoming politically 
vulnerable.  On 16 February 1911, the government presented a motion requesting the 
transfer of all Crown lands to the province.62  Scott indicated simply that the transfer 
payments the province was receiving had proven inadequate to meet the growing 
province’s needs.  Haultain had been vindicated, or would have been had he pointed out 
that federal jurisdiction over Crown lands was his main critique of The Saskatchewan 
Act and transferring them to provincial jurisdiction had been the main plank in the 
Provincial Rights Party platform since its founding.  Scott’s change of heart regarding 
the value of provincial management of Crown lands was due to the province’s inability 
to balance a budget without them.  It was becoming apparent that the financial 
provisions of the autonomy settlement had not taken the rapid growth of the province 
into consideration. Haultain was presented with the perfect opportunity to reclaim 
momentum.  Scott had tied his government’s credibility to the success of the autonomy 
settlement, just as Haultain had based so much of his reputation its rejection.  Could the 
government not fall over this?  
Unfortunately, Haultain was at the apex of a crusade against the cooperative 
movement from which he could not be distracted.  Farmers relied on elevator companies 
to store and sell their grain.  The grain handling companies had slowly acquired a 
monopoly that was used to inflate prices.  The province’s farmers demanded government 
action in response.  Federal jurisdiction over railways and inter-provincial trade limited 
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 the provincial government’s options.  In all three Prairie Provinces there were demands 
for the provincial government to expropriate the elevators and run them as public works.   
Haultain and Scott disagreed over who should operate the elevators: farmers, 
through cooperatives, or the provincial government.  Scott wanted to assist cooperative 
societies in purchasing the elevators.  He believed that the grain handling system would 
operate more efficiently if farmers had a direct hand in it.63  The legislation regulating 
the grain elevator system was introduced this session.  Haultain railed against the 
premier's refusal to “grant government elevators,” declaring that the whole concept of 
cooperative enterprises was based on “unbusinesslike principles.”  The people of 
Saskatchewan were increasingly turning to cooperatives as a means of controlling key 
enterprises.  Haultain’s objection to them was a little perverse, especially since their 
existence extended back into the early territorial period.  That Haultain focused on 
criticizing Scott’s popular elevator legislation instead of the ownership of Crown land 
was a stupid error. 
The end of Haultain’s political career came on 8 March 1911 when he came out 
in favour of the reciprocity pact that Prime Minister Laurier had just negotiated for 
Canada with the United States.  Supporting the government was good politics—access to 
the American market was vital to Canada’s growing harvests.  Scott suggested that the 
Legislature should pass a motion endorsing the federal policy and the assembly 
complied unanimously.  By endorsing the trade agreement Haultain had done the only 
sensible thing.  The problem for Haultain was that he flip-flopped. 
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 When it became clear that Laurier intended to campaign on the issue, Robert 
Borden, the Conservative leader, declared himself against the measure.  Borden claimed 
that unrestricted trade between the two countries would destroy the Canadian 
manufacturing industry.  Between the third and fourth sessions of the legislature, the 
federal Parliament was dissolved.  Most of the country turned on the Liberals.  
Removing the export tariffs would expose central Canadian manufactures to the 
American competition.  Many central Canadians saw in this the potential to destroy their 
economy. The prairies supported free trade as it would give them access to cheaper 
American machinery. 
Campaigning for the federal Conservatives, Haultain reversed himself by coming 
out against reciprocity.  Haultain’s support for Borden confirmed Liberal accusations 
that the non-partisan movement was nothing more than an organ of the Conservative 
party.  Supporting the Conservatives' trade policy during a general election campaign 
shattered Haultain’s claim of non-partisanship.  Taking a position so at odds with 
Saskatchewan’s farmers destroyed the Provincial Rights Party and ended any chance at 
becoming premier.   
The Provincial Rights Party limped through one more session of the provincial 
legislature.  With Robert Borden as prime minister, Scott now pushed hard for the 
transfer of Crown land to Saskatchewan’s jurisdiction.  He blamed everything wrong 
with local administration on the resource issue.   Haultain was unable to get any of the 
credit for this, despite campaigning for it since before Saskatchewan’s existence.  With 
The Provincial Rights Party caucus divided and drifting, the party slowly disintegrated.  
Shortly after the end of the fourth session, the Provincial Rights Party ‘merged’ with the 
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 Conservative Party.  It was less a merger and more of a re-branding: the Provincial 
Rights Party was now the Conservative Party in all but name. 
In time, many of Haultain’s political positions were vindicated.  Most of the 
defects inherent in The Saskatchewan Act were removed in 1930 when Saskatchewan 
obtained jurisdiction over Crown lands.64  Haultain also was the first politician to 
consistently pursue western grievances with the federal government.  He was the first to 
see that many of the Canadian prairies’ economic problems were at least partially the 
result of federal policies—policies more attuned to the needs of eastern Canada than the 
prairies. 
Unfortunately, Haultain was generally only persuasive in hindsight.  He failed to 
reclaim the premiership because, unlike Walter Scott, he was out of touch with the sprit 
of optimism that inundated the young province he sought to govern.  Unlike Scott, who 
sensed what the people of the province were feeling about any given issue, Haultain 
lacked political instinct.  Haultain often found himself trying to rectify past mistakes.  In 
doing this, he failed to capture the imagination of the optimistic electorate.  Haultain was 
re-elected to the third Legislative Assembly but did not take his seat, choosing instead to 
retire.   
                                                 



















Shortly after resigning from the Legislative Assembly, Haultain was appointed to 
the bench, becoming Chief Justice of Saskatchewan in 1912.  Haultain, now in his mid-
fifties, was beginning his third career.  The man who had dedicated his life to public 
service served the people of Saskatchewan for another 25 years.  When Haultain retired 
from the bench in 1938 he had acquired a reputation as a brilliant jurist. When he passed 
away in 1942, he was eulogised as a western Canadian statesman.  Without detracting 
from his many accomplishments, it’s safe to say that Haultain was far from perfect. 
As the jurisdiction of Legislative Assembly of the North-West Territories 
increased while revenues stagnated during the last decade of the nineteenth century, 
Territorial Premier Frederick W.G. Haultain did the best he could to deal with the 
problems this caused.  He tried to secure federal grants to compensate for the lack of 
taxing powers.  When Parliament repeatedly failed to link the grant’s value to territorial 
population growth, Haultain chose to agitate for provincial autonomy.  The jurist and 
constitutional historian in Haultain compared the challenges his Legislative Assembly 
faced to the challenges the British Parliament faced freeing itself from the Crown’s 
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 influence.  Haultain reasoned that if the Assembly, much like the British Parliament 
before it, obtained control over Crown land then the revenue they generated would 
enable to the region to set policy independent of the federal government. 
The ‘rights’ Haultain kept alluding to were not legally enforceable and could 
only be granted by an Act of Parliament.  Haultain realized that such an Act was 
necessary, but somehow believed that the prime minister could be convinced to grant 
autonomy with scholarly arguments.  Non-partisanship was perfectly rational before 
responsible government was granted to the North-West Territories in 1897, but after 
Haultain was officially appointed premier it quickly became a quagmire.1  As the 
number of issues increased due to the enlarged jurisdiction of the Assembly and 
government, this idea was less and less realistic. 
Haultain’s autonomy policy was essentially correct, but his weaknesses as a 
politician ensured that he was never able to challenge Laurier when the latter introduced 
The Saskatchewan Act in the House of Commons.  He constantly alluded to the ‘rights’ 
that they had been denied, mainly territorial control over Crown land, but elementary 
mistakes—such as embarrassing his colleagues or accepting the honorary presidency of 
the Territorial Conservative Party—caused the coalition that Haultain’s government 
depended on to fragment.  If he was aware of this problem, he failed to rectify it.  
Indeed, he seemed oblivious to it. 
In framing problems as part of a defect in the constitutional structure, Haultain 
set the genetic for the western Premiership.  He was the first to see that the terms of 
                                                 
1 Political parties are a method of organizing voters into coalitions capable of controlling 
parliaments.  Non-partisanship is premised on the belief that ‘right-thinking’ people can 
have only a single opinion on any given issue.  Obviously, there are usually as many 
unique political opinions as people. 
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 autonomy settlement placed fiscal and economic burdens on Saskatchewan (and 
Alberta) that the first six provinces did not share.  Crown land in Saskatchewan was 
used by the federal government for federal purposes and agricultural policy was fixed by 
parliament.  Haultain was the first—before and after 1905—to see many western 
problems as a result of a constitutional defect.   He was also the first to demand the 
constitutional amendments that would resolve them. 
What would have become of Saskatchewan had Haultain been appointed 
Premier?  It did have many great accomplishments to build upon.  The remarkable 
education systems in Saskatchewan and Alberta bore Haultain’s imprint, as did the 
Territorial transportation network and the nascent system of local government.  Haultain 
would have entered office determined to improve on these accomplishments.  However, 
Haultain would also have entered office with the belief that The Saskatchewan Act was 
both unwise and unconstitutional.  In his first campaign as leader of the Provincial 
Rights Party, Haultain said he was prepared to have the attorney-general of 
Saskatchewan go before the courts to argue that The Saskatchewan Act was 
unconstitutional.  The mind boggles at what might have ensued had a court of law 
agreed with this assessment.  It was, at the least, politically unwise to make arguments 
against provincehood when a sense of optimism was so prevalent in the West, and 
Canada was so optimistic about its future.  It is striking that Haultain was unable to 
sense the needs and desires of the electorate. 
In hindsight, Haultain must be given some credit for foreseeing the defects of 
The Saskatchewan Act.  By failing to transfer jurisdiction over Crown lands to the new 
province, the new government remained fiscally depended on federal grants, grants that 
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 quickly proved inadequate.  The argument carried some weight as the Provincial Rights 
Party did so well in the first general election, but why was such a party necessary in the 
first place?  Could he not have done equally as well as a Conservative?  The Liberals 
were the first to introduce partisanship in provincial politics.  Haultain could easily have 
followed their example.  After all, Haultain could have benefited from the financial and 
organizational support the Conservatives could have provided.  Haultain was 
mysteriously wedded to the non-partisan tradition.  Why he was so wedded to a flawed 
idea remains a mystery. 
Haultain was most comfortable when discussing the rights of the provincial 
Legislature, powers of taxation or the organization of the judicial system.  The issues 
that fuelled his imagination were constitutional, issues with which the electorate rarely 
shared his fascination.  Indeed, even when Haultain discussed issues which farmers 
thought important—the construction of roads and brides, the formation of school 
districts or the government’s ability to pay for all of this—he was most comfortable in 
arguing his position in the abstract language of rights.  Haultain’s fascination with legal 
questions would serve him well on the bench.  He was appointed to the Supreme Court 
of Saskatchewan by the Borden government shortly after resigning from office and 
when Chief Justice Wetmore resigned in 1912, Haultain was selected to replace him. 
When jurisdiction over Crown lands was transferred to the three Prairie 
Provinces in 1930, it was seen as a vindication of Haultain’s autonomy policy.2  The 
achievement of responsible government for the North-West Territories in 1897, his 
juridical tenure, and even the natural resources transfer in 1930 are the foundation of 
                                                 
2 British North America Act, 1930. 
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 Haultain’s reputation as an elder statesman.  Without detracting from these 
accomplishments, the role Haultain played in bringing about provincial autonomy and 
his leadership of the Provincial Rights Party was not those of a statesman.  Haultain 
failed to form a government because he lacked political savvy.  Western populists often 
believe that political savvy is a character flaw, not a necessary ingredient for leadership 
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